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This paper investigates whether executive wealth sensitivity to stock price 
fluctuations or executive equity transactions serve as incentives for earnings 
management. I find that increasing wealth sensitivity, most notably the sensitivity arising 
from stock holdings, is associated with CEO abnormal accrual usage. Further, the relation 
between abnormal accruals and stock-based wealth sensitivity is consistent with income-
smoothing earnings management. Since smooth earnings are associated with higher stock 
valuations my findings suggest that wealth exposure arising from stock ownership is 
effective in aligning the interests of CEOs and shareholders. 
I also analyze whether governance quality influences the wealth sensitivity-
abnormal accrual relation. While strong governance is associated with lower overall 
levels of abnormal accruals, governance does not significantly influence the association 
between CEO stock-based wealth sensitivity and earnings smoothing. The failure of 
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governance to curb earnings management supports the proposition that income smoothing 
is an expected outcome of efficient contracting consistent with incentive alignment.
 I also examine whether executives opportunistically manage earnings in order to 
maximize the value of their stock transactions. My findings suggest managers behave 
opportunistically. Specifically, I find an increase in income-decreasing accruals 
preceding large stock purchases by CEOs as well as an increase in income-increasing 
accruals following, but not preceding, large stock sales by CEOs; both suggest trading on 
private information. I also document that governance does not materially affect CEO use 
of abnormal accruals around transactions.
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 Chapter 1: Introduction
This dissertation provides evidence on the relations between executive stock-
based compensation and earnings management, and whether these relations are 
influenced by corporate governance structure. In particular, I examine the association of 
abnormal accruals with (1) executive wealth sensitivity to changes in stock price and (2) 
executive stock transactions. I define wealth sensitivity as the change in the value of the 
executive’s equity holdings given a one percent change in stock price. I find that chief 
executive officer (CEO) wealth sensitivity arising from stock holdings is associated with 
abnormal accruals, the association is consistent with income-smoothing, and variations in 
corporate governance do not appear to influence the association. I also find an association 
between CEO wealth sensitivity related to unvested stock options and abnormal accruals 
that is consistent with income-increasing earnings management. Further, this tendency to 
use income-increasing earnings management appears to decrease in governance quality.   
I also find evidence that CEOs use accruals to manipulate earnings around large 
stock transactions. Specifically, income-decreasing accruals precede large stock 
purchases and income-increasing accruals follow large stock sales. I find no evidence of 
accrual manipulations prior to CEO stock sales or option awards. When the tests are 
repeated for chief financial officers (CFOs) there is no indication of stock-related 
earnings management, except for use of income-decreasing accruals prior to option 
grants.
Use of equity-based compensation has undergone dramatic growth through the 
1990s. Concurrent with this growth there has been increasing concern about the cost and 
effectiveness of equity compensation, as well as its potential to motivate earnings 
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management.  Regulators, shareholder advocacy groups and the financial press have 
suggested that stock-based compensation provides incentives for managers to manipulate
accounting results for personal gain. For example, the Ninth Annual CEO Compensation 
Survey (2002), co-sponsored by the Institute for Policy Studies and United for a Fair 
Economy concludes “the current approach to compensation encourages excessive risk-
taking and the wide-spread adoption of aggressive accounting techniques that blur the 
truth and overstate earnings but boost CEO pay.” Similar concerns are expressed by 
Norman Johnson, former Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) commissioner, in his 
1999 speech: “Companies may attempt to manage earnings for numerous reasons … the 
single most important is the pressure … to meet analysts’ expectations...This factor, 
combined with recent increased emphasis on stock options as a key component of 
executive compensation …have both operated to increase the temptation for management 
to fudge the numbers.”
On the other hand, equity compensation is designed to align executive and 
shareholder incentives by giving the executive an ownership stake in the firm (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Advocates for equity-based pay contend that equity incentives are 
essential components of compensation that, when coupled with adequate governance 
controls, are effective in aligning the manager’s incentives with those of shareholders 
with minimal risk of adverse consequences. This position is supported by the governance 
literature which documents that the two most important functions of a corporate board of 
directors are designing compensation contracts for and monitoring of executive 
management (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). 
Given these opposing viewpoints, I investigate three sets of research questions. 
First, I examine whether CEO and CFO wealth sensitivities to stock price are associated 
with income-increasing and/or income-smoothing earnings management. I conduct cross-
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sectional regressions to investigate the relation between abnormal accruals and executive 
wealth sensitivity to stock price variations. I find that CEO, but not CFO, wealth 
sensitivity is positively associated with the magnitudes of both positive and negative 
abnormal accruals suggesting that wealth sensitivity is related to earnings management. I 
then repeat my regressions after decomposing wealth sensitivity into three components –
stock-based wealth sensitivity, vested option-based wealth sensitivity and unvested 
option-based wealth sensitivity – in order to determine whether the relations differ across 
holding types. I find the magnitudes of both positive and negative abnormal accruals 
increase directly with stock-based wealth sensitivity, the magnitudes of positive abnormal 
accruals increase with unvested option-based wealth sensitivity, and no significant 
association between abnormal accruals and vested option-based wealth sensitivity.
Next, I examine whether governance strength influences the relation between 
CEO wealth sensitivity and abnormal accruals. My proxy for governance strength is a 
synthesis of measures of board make-up, ownership structure and institutional 
environment which have been shown to influence use of abnormal accruals (Klein 2002; 
Koh 2003; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 2003; Xie, Davidson and DaDalt 2003). In order to 
examine whether governance affects the association between abnormal accruals and 
wealth sensitivity, I expand my regressions to include sensitivity-governance interaction 
terms. Governance does not appear to influence the relation between stock-based wealth 
sensitivity and abnormal accruals but does seem to attenuate the relation between 
unvested option-based wealth sensitivity and positive abnormal accruals.
To test whether the observed relation between stock-based wealth sensitivity and 
abnormal accruals is evidence of income-smoothing I investigate whether, conditional on 
large abnormal accrual magnitudes, higher sensitivity is associated with smoother 
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earnings. My results reveal the abnormal accrual usage is consistent with income-
smoothing.  
The second set of research questions examines whether CEOs and CFOs use 
income-increasing accruals prior to or following stock sales, and whether the tendency to 
inflate earnings is mitigated by governance. Earnings management may be used pre-sale 
to attempt to bolster stock price or prevent the value-decreasing effect of a negative 
earnings surprise. Earnings management may be used post-sale to delay earnings declines 
that would arouse suspicion that the trade was based on material inside information. 
I conduct an event study to examine positive abnormal accrual usage preceding 
and following insider sales. My tests reveal no evidence of income-increasing accruals 
preceding CEO and CFO sales. Thus, these insiders do not appear to manage earnings 
upwards in order to sell their shares at inflated prices. The CEOs do, however, appear to 
use positive accruals following large and medium sized stock sales suggesting they use 
accounting discretion to distance significant stock sales from the revelation of bad news. 
Furthermore, governance quality does not appear to deter the accrual usage.
My final research questions investigate whether insiders manipulate accruals 
preceding stock purchases and option grants and whether governance influences accrual 
use. Managers may behave opportunistically by taking actions to depress stock prices or 
avoid value increasing surprises prior to option incentive awards and open market stock 
purchases. Applying the same event study methodology used for insider sales, I find that 
abnormal accruals preceding large CEO stock purchases are significantly lower than 
control abnormal accruals consistent with CEOs opportunistically managing earnings in 
order to purchase shares at a discount. CEOs do not appear to take income-decreasing 
actions prior to option grants. 
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I find little evidence that CFOs manage earnings around their transactions except 
for the period immediately preceding option grants. The observed option grant–abnormal 
accrual relation for the CFOs is negative, consistent with pre-grant earnings management. 
Governance does not materially affect use of pre-grant or pre-purchase abnormal 
accruals.
In total my findings indicate that: abnormal accrual patterns consistent with 
income-smoothing earnings management are associated with the sensitivity of the CEO’s 
stock-based wealth to the firm’s stock price; income-increasing earnings management is 
associated with the sensitivity of CEO wealth to fluctuations in the value of unvested 
options; CEOs sell shares in expectation of poor earnings performance and use income-
increasing earnings management to distance their transactions from the disappointing 
news; CEOs use income-decreasing earnings management preceding large equity 
purchases; income-decreasing accruals precede CFO option grants; and corporate 
governance does not seem to influence any of these relations except the association 
between unvested option-based wealth sensitivity and abnormal accruals which decreases 
in governance strength.
This study contributes to both the earnings management and corporate governance 
literatures. My results suggest that CEO wealth sensitivity and CEO stock transactions 
provide incentives to manage earnings. These findings have implications for 
compensation design. Executive exposure to firm specific risk may have unintended 
consequences that are not mitigated by more effective monitoring. On the other hand, the 
ability to empirically document compensation related earnings management suggests that, 
consistent with a number of analytic models, it may be part of an equilibrium 
compensation structure (see Arya, Glover and Sunder 1998 for a summary). The failure 
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of governance to significantly impact most of the observed earnings management further 
supports this possibility.
These results also have potential policy implications. In the wake of the 
accounting scandals of the last several years, regulators have tightened standards for 
corporate governance. My findings suggest that reliance on such standards as deterrents 
to compensation-related earnings management may not be warranted. 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 summarizes 
prior research relevant to my questions. Motivation for the questions and hypothesis 
development are included in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the empirical investigation of 
the association between executive wealth sensitivity and abnormal accruals and the 
influence of governance on the association. Chapter 5 examines the relations among 
insider trading, earnings management and governance. I discuss my findings and 
conclude my study in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This study draws and builds on three major streams of accounting and finance 
research – compensation and governance, insider trading, and earnings management. This 
chapter provides a review of the studies that form the basis for my hypotheses as well as 
those studies that provide related evidence. 
2.1 COMPENSATION CONTRACTING
The literature on compensation contracting is extensive. I selectively survey the 
studies related to issues that are particularly relevant to my research design. First, I 
briefly explore the role of equity in compensation contracting. Next, I review recent 
trends in executive compensation. Finally, I examine alternative approaches to measuring 
the incentive effects arising from managerial ownership.
2.1.1 Use of Equity in Compensation Contracting
Firms may elect to use equity awards to compensate executives because of cash 
constraints, in order to minimize reported compensation expense or due to tax 
considerations. Both stock awards and option grants provide a means of rewarding 
employees without a cash outlay. Ittner, Lambert and Larcker 2001 document that cash-
constrained technology firms rely on equity compensation more than manufacturing 
firms. Bryan, Hwang and Lillian (2000) also find cash constraints are important 
determinants of option compensation. 
In addition, options are accorded favorable accounting and tax treatments. The 
value of option grants is not recognized as compensation expense under U.S. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and equity awards tied to performance hurdles 
are exempt from the $1 million tax deductibility limit on compensation. Dechow, Hutton 
and Sloan (1996) and Core and Guay (1999) find evidence that option use is greater for 
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firms that face greater costs of reporting low earnings. Bryan, Hwang and Lillian (2000) 
document that tax status also influences compensation practices.
 However, most firms view equity awards as a low cost mechanism to help 
managers achieve a desired level of ownership (Core and Guay 1999). Agency theory 
predicts that managerial ownership mitigates moral hazard by aligning managerial and 
shareholder interests. A substantial body of theoretic research holds that tying managerial 
compensation to firm performance reduces the agency problems that arise from the 
separation of corporate ownership and control (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Homstrom 1979). 
While there is no model of equilibrium ownership, scholars agree that optimal 
ownership is endogenously determined based on firm, contracting and industry 
characteristics in a manner intended to minimize agency costs. Empirical evidence 
suggests that target levels of managerial ownership exist in practice. Firms grant more 
equity compensation to executives with low equity incentives (Core and Guay 1999), and 
these executives do not have offsetting stock sales in the years they receive new awards 
(Ofek and Yermack 2000). However, Ofek and Yermack (2000) also find that once 
managers achieve a certain ownership level they actively rebalance their portfolios when 
they receive new equity awards. 
2.1.2 Trends in Executive Compensation Contracting
Most executive pay packages include three major elements: a fixed salary, a 
performance-based bonus and equity-based pay, usually given in the form of restricted 
stock or as option grants. Salary is independent of firm outcomes, but bonus is often tied 
to accounting-based performance measures. The value of equity-based pay depends on 
stock performance. For this reason, Jensen and Murphy (1990) specifically advocate 
equity-based compensation as a means of providing incentives for managers to maximize 
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firm value. Furthermore, equity-based pay encourages stock ownership which creates a 
direct link between manager and shareholder welfare by providing managerial incentives 
to increase stock price. 
Despite the apparent importance of executive ownership, Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) concluded the equity holdings of the average CEO did not appear to generate 
sufficient incentives to overcome self-interested perquisite consumption. Their findings 
and conclusions formed the basis for a shift in executive compensation practices which 
increased emphasis on equity-based pay. In 1980, CEOs received an average $155,000 in 
option grants and $655,000 in salary and bonus pay (Hall and Liebman 1998). By 1994, 
the average annual option award of $1.2 million nearly equaled average total cash 
compensation of $1.3 million. By 1998, median stock and option holdings of Standard & 
Poor’s (S & P) industrials CEOs stood at $30 million and $55 million (Hall and Murphy 
2002) confirming that the intensive use of equity awards, coupled with a bull market, 
succeeded in increasing managerial ownership. Furthermore, equity incentives are now 
the primary drivers of CEO wealth formation. Hall and Liebman (1998) find that the 
changes in CEO wealth from stock and option revaluations are over fifty times the wealth 
increases from salary and bonus changes. 
2.1.3 Measurement of Equity Incentives
Despite the importance of equity incentives in executive contracting, there is a 
great deal of uncertainty about how to measure incentives and how firms determine 
optimal incentive levels. In particular, there is considerable debate over the correct basis 
to use in assessing incentive levels, and at a more fundamental level, how to value 
executive equity holdings.
Financial economists have traditionally viewed executive incentives in terms of 
pay-performance sensitivity where pay is change in executive wealth and performance is 
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change in firm value. Under this definition incentives are directly determined by the 
percentage of the firm owned by the executive. This concept of incentives is based on 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), who suggest an agency problem exists whenever an 
executive owns less than 100% of the firm because managers with lower levels of 
ownership have an incentive to consume perquisites since the manager enjoys the full 
benefit of the perquisite but only bears his fractional share of the cost. Based on this 
“share of the firm owned” concept of pay-performance sensitivity, Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) find the median wealth of a CEO rises by $3.25 when the value of the corporation 
increases by $1000 for a sample consisting of CEOs listed in the Forbes Executive 
Compensation Surveys. They conclude that CEO equity incentives are too weak to be 
economically meaningful.
Another regularity observed using this definition of incentives is that the 
incentives of CEOs of large firms are usually insignificant relative to those for CEOs of 
small firms. To illustrate, consider two CEOs – one who owns 0.1% of a firm with a 
market value of $1 billion while the other holds 20% of the stock of a $5 million firm. 
Both CEOs hold equity valued at $1 million, but the small firm’s CEO has incentives that 
are two hundred times stronger than those of the large firm’s CEO. This result is 
troubling since theory and common sense both suggest that large firm CEOs should 
require greater incentives than their small firm counterparts.1
These apparent contradictions have led a growing number of researchers to 
advocate use of a more holistic, manager-centered perspective for measuring incentives. 
This approach considers the importance of equity valuation shifts relative to the 
executive’s total wealth. For example, the $85 million median level of equity holdings 
1 For example, Demsetz and Len (1985) argue that it is more difficult to monitor managers of large firms 
which leads to greater moral hazard; Smith and Watts (1992) suggest that large firms require more talented 
managers who must be highly compensated.
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documented by Hall and Liebman (1998) for large firm (i.e. S & P 500) CEOs leads them 
to conclude that high levels of personal wealth exposure provide powerful incentives for 
risk- averse, wealth-constrained CEOs even though their percentage holdings may be 
small. 
Baker and Hall (2004) reconcile these conflicting views with a model that 
demonstrates how the manner in which CEO actions affect firm value determines the 
appropriate basis for evaluating incentive effects. If a CEO action primarily affects dollar 
returns, as is typically the case for perquisite consumption, then the traditional share of 
the firm owned approach is appropriate. However, when actions (e.g. strategic actions) 
affect firm percentage returns, incentives arise from the effects of a change in stock price 
on the value of the executive’s holdings so the manager-centered perspective applies. The 
latter case holds when the percentage impact of the CEO action remains fairly constant 
across firms of varying sizes suggesting the agency problem faced by large firms is 
similar to that of smaller firms for these types of activities.  Core, Guay and Larcker 
(2003) point out that this is likely to be true in the majority of situations.
Regardless of which measure is appropriate, implementing either requires equity 
instruments be valued from the executive’s perspective. While most researchers use
market value for share holdings and Black Scholes value for option holdings, it is widely 
acknowledged that executive options violate several major assumptions underlying the 
Black Scholes model. First, the options are non-transferable so market price may not be 
the appropriate measure of value.  Second, Black Scholes assumes a risk-neutral investor, 
which is not descriptive of the typical executive whose wealth is concentrated in the firm. 
As a consequence, incentives estimated using Black Scholes values do not adjust for the 
additional risk imposed on undiversified executives. In order to accurately adjust for risk, 
a researcher must know the form of the executive’s utility function and the nature and 
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amount of the executive’s non-firm assets – neither of which is generally available. 
However, Baker and Hall (2004) conclude that variation in CEOs’ marginal utilities of 
income arising from non-firm wealth is not likely to be significant when compared to 
variations in wealth resulting from their firm holdings.
The importance of risk-adjusting estimated option values is also debatable. Core 
and Guay (2003) argue that, assuming an executive can rebalance his portfolio within a 
reasonably short amount of time, risk imposition on undiversified executives should not 
affect their valuation of their new grants or of the wealth effects from their existing 
holdings. The logic underlying their argument is summarized as follows. On average, 
incentive contracting is optimal. If an executive holds a lower value of firm stock than 
has been contracted upon, new awards will be retained to meet the requirements of his ex 
ante agreement. These awards will not be discounted since they do not alter the amount 
of risk the executive has contracted for. Equity awards made when an executive has 
achieved optimal risk-sharing are given as a substitute for cash compensation due to tax, 
accounting or liquidity considerations. Firms expect executives to rebalance their 
portfolios when they receive awards made in lieu of cash compensation. Since the 
executive sheds the risk through rebalancing no additional risk is borne and he does not 
discount the value of the grant. Similarly, since portfolio revaluations do not alter the 
agreed upon level of equity holdings, the revaluation may be used to either meet 
contractual requirements, or the additional value may be divested. Again, there is no 
reason for the executive to discount the incentives arising from his portfolio revaluation.
2.2 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
This section gives a survey of relevant earnings management literature. First I   
briefly explore two earnings management strategies - directional earnings management, 
where the objective is to shift the mean value of reported earnings, and income-
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smoothing earnings management, where the objective is to reduce the time series 
variance of reported earnings. Next, I provide an overview of the research on capital 
markets earnings management incentives. 
2.2.1 Directional Earnings Management 
Most earnings management studies assume directional income manipulation; they 
examine specific settings where there are incentives to increase or decrease earnings 
employing unidirectional tests. Often, these studies are structured as event studies where 
the incentive is the event; other studies use a cross-sectional design where the incentive is 
a sample characteristic. Examples of the former include capital market studies where the 
event is meeting or beating analyst forecasts (Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser 1999), and 
studies of earnings management related to debt contracting where the event is a potential 
covenant violation (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). Event-type studies, by virtue of their 
research design, do not examine whether the observed evidence of earnings management 
is part of a smoothing strategy.
On the other hand, cross-sectional studies implicitly assume that the characteristic 
motivating the earnings management elicits repeated use of unidirectional earnings 
management. Studies using a cross-sectional approach examine whether income-
increasing earnings management increases in firm characteristics such as board 
independence (Beasley 1996; Klein 2002; Peasnell, Pope and Young 2000; Xie, 
Davidson and DaDalt 2003), or management characteristics such as level of stock-based 
wealth compensation (Cheng and Warfield 2003; Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew 2003). 
If abnormal accruals are the measure of earnings management, the test design looks for 
abnormal accruals that are on average more positive (or more negative) for high levels of 
the motivating characteristic than for low levels of the characteristic. 
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In total, evidence of directional earnings management is abundant. Income-
increasing and/or income–decreasing earnings management is associated with bonus 
compensation, debt contracts, regulatory and capital markets benchmarks, and issuance 
of equity. 
Furthermore, earnings management appears to successfully influence beliefs 
about a firms’ economic performance despite the transparency of the incentives. For 
example, Sloan (1996) and Collins and Hribar (2000) find the market overestimates the 
persistence of accruals. Sloan shows that firms with high current accruals experience 
declines in both earnings and price over the next three years. Collins and Hribar 
document that the mis-pricing of accruals is economically meaningful. 
2.2.2 Income-Smoothing Earnings Management
Earnings smoothing involves inter-temporal shifting of reported earnings in order 
to make earnings appear less variable over time.  Smoothing has been the subject of 
accounting research for the past 40 years. Unlike the directional earnings management 
literature the smoothing literature is more exploratory, aimed primarily at documenting 
the existence of smoothing rather than understanding the motivation for smoothing. 
While a number of theoretical papers model smoothing motives, few empirical studies 
attempt to test the theories. One exception is DeFond and Park (1997) who test 
implications of the Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) model that suggests managers’ job 
security concerns motivate them to smooth earnings. They find that when current 
earnings are low (high) and expected future earnings are high (low) managers borrow 
earnings from (reserve earnings for) the future, which they assert is consistent with the 
job security model.
In another recent study, Subramanyam (1996) conducts an extensive series of 
tests to identify the extent to which smoothing is used in practice. He finds evidence of 
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pervasive income smoothing and documents that smoothing improves the predictability 
and persistence of reported earnings. 
The motive for smoothing is clear – firms with smooth earnings command a 
market premium over those with variable earnings. Allayanis and Weston (2003) find 
that a one standard deviation increase in earnings volatility is associated with a 6 to 21 
percent decrease in firm value. Thomas and Zhang (2002) confirm that higher price 
earnings (P/E) ratios are associated with lower earnings volatility and this P/E effect is 
due to lower risk and higher forecasted growth.
2.2.3 Earnings Management Incentives
Existing research usually attempts to document earnings management by 
examining situations where incentives to manage earnings are high. Most rely on either 
abnormal accrual levels or patterns of reported earnings around certain benchmarks as 
measures or indicators of earnings manipulation. Earnings management motives fall into 
two general categories – contracting-based motives and capital markets motives. This 
dissertation builds on the capital markets literature, so I limit my review to this area.
A substantial body of recent research documents that capital market concerns 
appear to motivate earnings management. One stream of research examines specific 
capital market activities such as initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs) which provide a setting where managers may use earnings management 
to attempt to increase the proceeds from the stock sales.  These studies are motivated by 
observations that IPO and SEO firms under-perform the market in the years following 
their offerings. 
Teoh, Wong and Rao (1998) find IPO firms have high positive issue-year 
abnormal accruals and that these accruals explain the variation in post-issue earnings and 
stock returns. The findings related to SEOs are similar. Rangan (1998) and Teoh, Welch 
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and Wong (1998) document that abnormally high earnings reported at the time of SEOs 
are attributable to accruals, post-SEO earnings are unusually poor and the post-SEO stock 
performance is inversely related to the extent of pre-SEO earnings management. Taken as 
a whole, the results of these studies suggest that equity issuance provides a strong 
incentive to manage earnings, and the extent of the earnings management and the 
incentives to overstate income prior to equity issuance are not fully appreciated by 
investors. 
A second stream of capital markets earnings management research relies on 
distributional regularities of earnings to infer earnings management. The seminal work in 
this area is Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, BD). BD examines distributions of reported 
earnings around two earnings benchmarks – zero earnings, and prior period earnings. 
Their findings are consistent with the hypotheses that managers have incentives to avoid 
reporting losses and earnings declines. Subsequent studies using BD’s methodology show 
that accounting discretion is used to sustain earnings growth strings (Beatty, Ke and 
Petroni 2002) and to meet or exceed analysts’ forecasts (Burgstahler and Eames 2002). 
Since missing a benchmark has a significant negative effect on valuation (Bartov, 
Givoly and Hayn 2000; Skinner and Sloan 2000), and since firms that maintain consistent 
growth strings command a market premium (Barth, Elliott and Finn 1999), such earnings 
management appears to be economically motivated. 
2.3 EQUITY-BASED COMPENSATION CONTRACTING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
This final section of the literature review focuses on research that is closely 
related to my study. Only recently have researchers started to explore whether equity-
based compensation contracting may provide incentives to manage earnings. Evidence 
amassed to date suggests it does. 
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2.3.1 Earnings Management Associated with Compensation Mix and Ownership 
Three recent papers provide evidence related to stock-based compensation and 
earnings management. Gao and Shrieves (2002, GS) examine the relation between 
various compensation components and earnings management. They find that bonuses, 
option grants and the incentive intensity of option grants are directly related to 
magnitudes of discretionary current accruals. They do not test for equity related wealth 
sensitivity, nor do they control for equity holdings in their regressions. 
In a related study, Cheng and Warfield (2003, CW) also document a relation 
between equity compensation elements and earnings management. They find the 
probability of earnings meeting or just beating analyst forecasts increases in stock-based 
compensation, and that income-increasing abnormal accruals are positively associated 
with stock-based compensation and future stock sales. 
One previous study, Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew (2003, EHM), explicitly 
examines executive wealth sensitivity to stock price for a sample limited to 46 firms 
accused of accounting fraud by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  For this 
unique sample, they find the probability of fraud is increasing in the percent of 
compensation that is stock-based but the relation between their estimate of executive 
sensitivity and fraud is not significant. 
2.3.2 Earnings Management Surrounding Insider Transactions
Evidence of possible management of earnings and/or disclosures prior to insider 
equity sales is found in several studies (Summers and Sweeney 1998, Beneish 1999; 
Beneish and Vargus 2001, Noe 2000). In addition, insider sales are found to be more 
predictive of long-term performance than short-term performance (Lakonishok and Lee 
2000), and insider selling tends to follow positive quarterly earnings news (Sivakumar 
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and Waymire 1994), both of which are consistent with a pattern of pre-sale information 
management. 
More direct evidence is documented in Beneish, Press and Vargus (2004, BPV) 
and Bartov and Mohanram (2004, BM). BPV find, for a sample of firms with subsequent 
debt covenant defaults, that positive abnormal accruals are used following but not 
preceding insider stock sales. In contrast to BPV, BM show that large insider option 
exercises are preceded by abnormally positive earnings and followed by poor earnings 
performance. They conclude that executives opportunistically manage pre-exercise 
earnings to increase their cash payouts, and the reversals of the pre-exercise 
overstatements negatively affect the post-exercise period
The findings related to option grants also suggest opportunistic information 
management. Several studies document strategic disclosure to manage market 
expectations downwards prior to option grants. For example, post-grant earnings 
announcements are found to be generally more favorable than pre-grant earnings 
announcements (Yermack 1997); analysts’ forecasts issued preceding executive stock 
option awards are less optimistically biased than forecasts issued for the same firms 
during other periods, and managers appear to increase voluntary disclosure of negative 
news prior to option grants (Aboody and Kasznik 2000). Additional studies find 
abnormal positive returns following insider purchases (Seyhun 1998; Lackonishok and 
Lee 2001) consistent with pre-purchase or pre-grant depression of stock prices. Baker, 
Collins and Reitenga (2003) directly examine for and find a positive relation between 
negative abnormal accruals and size of subsequent CEO option grants.
2.3.3 Governance and Earnings Management
Corporate governance refers to “the relationships among management, the board 
of directors, shareholders, and other stakeholders in a company. These relationships 
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provide a framework within which corporate objectives are set and performance is 
monitored.”2 Each component of a firm’s governance structure is determined by the other 
governance features and the nature of the firm’s business (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Research has identified three pivotal elements of governance – the board of directors, 
executive compensation and outside block holders. The combination of institutional 
features such as accounting rules and securities regulations, and corporate governance 
structure should deter any inefficient earnings management that might arise as a result of 
managerial compensation contracting.
Several studies provide evidence that earnings management varies across board 
and ownership characteristics. Abnormal accruals (Klein 2002; Xie, Davidson and 
DaDalt 2003), positive abnormal accruals (Peasnell, Pope and Young 2000) and 
likelihood of financial statement fraud (Beasley 1996) decrease in the proportion of 
outside members on a firm’s board of directors. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (DSS, 
1996) find GAAP violators are more likely to have insider-dominated boards, a CEO who 
is also the chairman of the board and a CEO who is also a founder of the firm.
DSS additionally find GAAP violators are less likely to have an outside 
blockholder. Similar findings are documented by Koh (2003) who finds income-
increasing discretionary accruals decline in institutional ownership for Australian firms 
with high levels of institutional ownership, and Rajgopal, Venkatachalam and Jiambalvo 
(2002) who show that the absolute value of discretionary accruals is negatively related to 
institutional ownership. Finally, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) examine the 
differences in earnings management across 31 countries; they document that earnings 
management decreases in investor protection. Taken as a whole, these studies suggest 
2 Mehran, H., 2003. Introduction to FRBNY Economic Policy Review. April, 2003.
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that governance structure impacts the financial reporting strategies employed by 
managers.
Executive compensation practices also vary systematically with both board 
structure and firm ownership. Using a sample of 153 manufacturing firms for the period 
1979 to 1980, Mehran (1995) finds the proportion of executive compensation that is 
equity-based increases with board independence and decreases with the percentage of 
shares held by outside block holders. He reasons that independent directors, as more 
effective representatives of shareholder interests, tie more of managers’ compensation to 
firm value through equity compensation. In addition, he suggests that block holder 
monitoring supplants some of the need for incentive alignment as the reason why equity 
compensation declines in block holder ownership. The role of outside investors in 
compensation design is also investigated by Hartzell and Starks (2003) who provide 
empirical evidence that institutional investors with large holdings influence the level and 
structure of executive compensation, and that institutional investors in general show a 
preference for firms where executives have high pay-for-performance sensitivities.
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Chapter 3: Hypothesis Development
A study published in 1990 by Jensen and Murphy concluded that corporate 
executives’ ownership of their firms was too low to provide meaningful incentives. These 
findings precipitated an increased emphasis on equity compensation that resulted in 
substantial growth in executive equity holdings during the 1990s. Hall and Murphy 
(2002) report that median stock and option holdings of S&P 500 executives grew from 
$11 million in 1992 to more than $31 million by 1999.
Jensen and Murphy (1990) point out that managerial stock ownership is desirable 
because it establishes a direct link between executive and shareholder wealth. The 
effectiveness of ownership in establishing such a link is borne out by the high sensitivity
of executive wealth to stock price changes. For example, Hall and Liebman (1998) find 
that changes in CEO wealth from stock and option revaluations are over fifty times those 
from salary and bonus changes. 
Regulators, shareholder advocacy groups and the financial press have expressed 
concern that the expanded use of stock-based wealth compensation encourages use of 
aggressive accounting to increase executive pay. There are three distinct ways equity 
compensation may generate incentives for executives to manage earnings. First, wealth 
sensitivity may increase executive concern with stock prices. Dechow and Skinner (2000) 
observes that managers’ increased wealth sensitivity to stock prices has intensified 
incentives to manage earnings to maintain and increase stock valuations. Second, 
executives may be motivated to report higher earnings or to avoid earnings declines 
either before or after stock sales. Pre-sale earnings management would allow an 
executive to sell his shares at potentially inflated values, while post-sale earnings 
management might be used to avoid detection of insider trading. Finally, a manager 
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might use earnings manipulations to artificially depress stock prices prior to a stock 
purchase in order to purchase the shares at a discount, or prior to an option grant thereby 
reducing the exercise price of the option. 
3.1 WEALTH SENSITIVITY AS A MOTIVE FOR EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
I define wealth sensitivity as the change in executive wealth given a one percent 
change in stock price. Wealth sensitivity, which provides the majority of CEO incentives 
to increase stock price (Hall and Liebman 1998), could potentially motivate either 
income-smoothing or income- increasing earnings management. 
Smoothing may be an effective strategy for an executive to use to maximize the 
value of his holdings. Empirical research uniformly documents a positive association 
between earnings smoothness and stock valuation. Allayanis and Weston (2003) find that 
a one standard deviation increase in earnings volatility is associated with a 6 to 21 
percent decrease in firm value. Thomas and Zhang (2002) confirm that higher price-
earnings ratios (P/E) are associated with lower earnings volatility. 
Theoretical models explore a variety of explanations for the relation between 
smooth earnings and stock value. For example, Goel and Thakor (2003) model smoothing 
as a means of reducing the informational advantages of informed outside investors 
thereby minimizing the expected losses to liquidity trading. Ronen and Sadan (1981) 
consider smoothing as providing a credible signal of higher quality earnings. Trueman 
and Titman (1988) suggest smooth earnings reduce perceived probabilities of default and 
therefore decrease borrowing costs. 
All these studies suggest that CEOs with significant ownership interests in their 
firms have incentives to smooth earnings to maximize their wealth and to maximize the 
proceeds from their unplanned liquidity sales. Furthermore, the valuation effects of 
smoothing benefit all shareholders consistent with incentive alignment.
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On the other hand, the wealth-implications of share price movements may cause a 
manager to become focused on current stock price and take actions to bolster short-term 
value by inflating reported earnings. Such behavior is consistent with Stein’s (1989) 
model of the myopic manager who uses income-increasing earnings management to 
increase short-term stock price, and the Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) model 
where, in speculative markets, a CEO may take actions that encourage speculation to 
increase stock price in the short run. In their model managers pursue actions that are 
likely to cause divergence in investor beliefs in order to increase speculative value. 
Prior research indicates income-increasing earnings management may be effective 
at raising stock values. Barth, Elliott and Finn (1999) find that firms with patterns of 
continuous earnings growth are priced at a premium, the premium increases 
monotonically with the length of the growth pattern, and the premium decreases 
substantially when the pattern is broken. Other studies document that firms that meet or 
beat analyst forecasts enjoy a quarterly stock return premium of 3% (Bartov, Givoly and 
Hayn 2000), while missing an earnings benchmark is associated with a precipitous 
decline in value, particularly for growth stocks (Skinner and Sloan 2000). Furthermore, a 
substantial body of evidence documents that income-increasing accruals are priced (Sloan 
1996; Beneish and Vargus 2002; Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan 2001).
Consequently, income-increasing earnings management might also be motivated 
by executive wealth sensitivity to stock price. If earnings management is used to 
maximize equity-based wealth I expect the incentive to manage earnings will increase in 
wealth sensitivity. The hypothesis (in alternate form) is
H1a: Income-increasing or income-smoothing earnings management is positively 
associated with executive wealth sensitivity to stock price.
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3.2 STOCK SALES AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
One problem with use of an income-increasing earnings management strategy is 
that accounting accruals, the most flexible mechanism for managing earnings within the 
limits of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), reverse over time. 
Continuous inflation of earnings requires increasingly aggressive accounting 
manipulations leading to a “bloated” balance sheet (Barton and Simko 2002). However, 
intermittent manipulation of accruals may afford executives the opportunity to optimize 
planned transactions without facing balance sheet constraints.
First, if a manager sells shares based on proprietary knowledge about current or 
future firm performance, earnings management may be used post-sale to prevent earnings 
declines that would arouse suspicion that the trade was based on material inside 
information. Insider trading regulations are designed to discourage insiders from using 
their informational advantages for personal gain. Enforcement of the regulations and 
shareholder litigation related to insider trading has historically focused on insider stock 
transactions occurring prior to information releases because that is the time when 
information asymmetry is considered to be greatest. As a consequence, an executive who 
sells based on foreknowledge of value decreasing news has incentives to distance the sale 
from an anticipated earnings decline. Evidence that insider sales are more predictive of 
long-term performance than short-term performance (Lakonishok and Lee 2000) is 
consistent with such a strategy. 
Two additional studies provide evidence consistent with post-sale earnings 
management by insiders. Ke, Huddart, and Petroni  (2003) find that insiders sell stock as 
long as two years prior to a break in an earnings growth string, but appear to avoid trades 
in the two quarters immediately preceding the break. For a sample of firms that 
subsequently experience a technical default, Beneish, Press and Vargus (2003) find 
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evidence of income-increasing earnings management following abnormal selling but not 
preceding abnormal selling. They conclude that executives use earnings management to 
distance their sales from the default. 
Second, earnings management may be used prior to execution of a sale in order to 
bolster stock prices or to avoid value-decreasing earnings surprises. The incentive to 
report good news or to avoid reporting bad news prior to insider sales is readily apparent. 
In addition, many firms have internal policies restricting trading by insiders to periods 
immediately following earnings reports (Bettis, Coles and Lemmon 2000). Such 
limitations may increase pressure on managers desiring to sell stock to seek value 
increasing surprises and avoid value decreasing surprises in the announcements 
immediately preceding planned sales. Evidence suggestive of possible management of 
earnings and/or disclosures prior to insider equity sales is found in several studies 
(Sivakumar and Waymire 1994; Summers and Sweeney 1998; Beneish 1999; Beneish 
and Vargus 2001; Noe 2000).  Therefore, stock sales may motive earnings management 
in pre- and post-sale periods.
H2a:  Income-increasing earnings management is used prior to or following 
executive stock sales.
3.2 EQUITY ACQUISITIONS AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Managers may also opportunistically manage earnings preceding option grants 
and open market stock purchases. Options are typically granted with an exercise (strike) 
price fixed at, or tied to, the stock price on the date of grant. Since the value of an option 
depends primarily on the spread between the market and exercise prices, there is an 
incentive to minimize the share price on the grant date. Several studies document 
strategic disclosure to manage market expectations downwards prior to option grants. For 
example, post-grant earnings announcements are found to be generally more favorable 
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than pre-grant earnings announcements (Yermack 1997), analysts’ forecasts issued 
preceding grants are less optimistically biased than forecasts issued for the same firms 
during other periods, and managers appear to increase voluntary disclosure of negative 
news prior to option grants (Aboody and Kasznik 2000). On the other hand, it is highly 
uncertain whether the benefits of earnings management prior to a grant would ever be 
realized since most options cannot be exercised until several years following the grant.
Similarly, if a manager is planning to acquire shares through an open market 
purchase he may be able to artificially depress stock prices using income-decreasing 
earnings management. Studies find abnormal positive returns following insider purchases 
(Seyhun 1998; Lackonishok and Lee 2001) suggesting insiders purchase shares they 
believe are undervalued; such undervaluation could result if deliberate actions are taken 
to depress stock prices prior to a stock purchase. In total, the above research suggests that 
managers may behave opportunistically by taking actions that depress stock prices prior 
to option incentive awards and open market purchases.
H3a:  Managers use income decreasing earnings management prior to option 
grants and stock purchases.
3.4 GOVERNANCE AS A CONSTRAINT ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Positive accounting theory predicts that managers make accounting choices that 
are either efficient or opportunistic; efficient choices increase the wealth of all 
contracting parities whereas opportunistic choices make the manager better off at the 
expense of some other stakeholder(s) (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
The set of acceptable accounting practices and the potential to use reporting 
discretion opportunistically are limited by both institutional and firm-specific constraints. 
Institutional constraints arise primarily from SEC regulations that implement the 
provisions of the Securities Exchange Acts of 1934; their requirements, which apply to 
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all publicly held firms, mandate public filing of audited financial statements prepared in 
accordance with GAAP and place restrictions on insider trading. In addition, state and 
local laws, which vary across jurisdictions, also impose restrictions and requirements on 
corporations. The institutional features faced by a firm are relatively fixed. On the other 
hand, governance is self-selected and is tailored to discourage executive behavior that is 
harmful to shareholders. In total, the combination of institutional features and corporate 
governance structure should serve to limit any inefficient earnings management that 
might arise as a result of managerial compensation contracting.
Corporate governance refers to “the relationships among management, the board 
of directors, shareholders, and other stakeholders in a company. These relationships 
provide a framework within which corporate objectives are set and performance is 
monitored.”3 Each component of a firm’s governance structure is determined by the other 
governance features, the environment the firm operates in and the nature of the firm’s 
business (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Research has identified three pivotal elements of 
governance – the board of directors, executive compensation and outside block holders. 
Each of these elements has been documented to influence both abnormal accrual use and 
compensation design. 
Several studies provide evidence that earnings management varies across board 
and ownership characteristics. Abnormal accruals (Klein 2002; Xie, Davidson and 
DaDalt 2003), positive abnormal accruals (Peasnell, Pope and Young 2000) and 
likelihood of financial statement fraud (Beasley 1996) decrease in the proportion of 
outside members on a firm’s board of directors. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (DSS, 
1996) find GAAP violators are more likely to have insider-dominated boards, a CEO who 
is also the chairman of the board and a CEO who is also a founder of the firm.
3 Mehran, H., 2003. Introduction to FRBNY Economic Policy Review. April, 2003.
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DSS also find GAAP violators are less likely to have an outside blockholder. 
Similar findings are documented by Koh (2003) who finds income-increasing 
discretionary accruals decline in institutional ownership for Australian firms with high 
levels of institutional ownership, and Rajgopal, Venkatachalam and Jiambalvo (2002) 
who show that the absolute value of discretionary accruals is negatively related to 
institutional ownership. Finally, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) examine the 
differences in earnings management across 31 countries; they document that earnings 
management decreases in investor protection. Taken as a whole, these studies suggest 
that governance structure impacts the financial reporting strategies employed by 
managers.
Executive compensation practices also vary systematically with both board 
structure and firm ownership. Using a sample of 153 manufacturing firms for the period 
1979 to 1980, Mehran (1995) finds the proportion of executive compensation that is 
equity-based increases with board independence and decreases with the percentage of 
shares held by outside block holders. He reasons that independent directors, as more 
effective representatives of shareholder interests, tie more of managers’ compensation to 
firm value through equity compensation. In addition, he suggests that block holder 
monitoring supplants some of the need for incentive alignment as the reason why equity 
compensation declines in block holder ownership. The role of outside investors in 
compensation design is also investigated by Hartzell and Starks (2003) who document 
that institutional investors with large holdings influence the level and structure of 
executive compensation, and that institutional investors in general show a preference for 
firms where executives have high pay-for-performance sensitivities.
Since the primary purpose of managerial ownership is incentive alignment, self-
interested behavior arising from the incentive effects of ownership may be an expected 
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outcome of efficient contracting. In particular, income-smoothing is typically modeled in 
the theoretical literature as a value maximizing strategy (e.g. Goel and Thakor 2003) and 
has been documented in empirical research to be positively related to stock valuations 
(Thomas and Zhang 2002; Allayannis and Weston 2003 ).  
On the other hand, providing managers with discretion over reported earnings 
when earnings impact their wealth and/or consumption creates a potential agency 
conflict. Furthermore, regulators take a dim view of earnings management even when it 
is likely to benefit shareholders. For example, the SEC defines inappropriate earnings 
management without qualification as “the practice of distorting the true financial 
performance of the company.”4 Arthur Levitt, then Chairman of the SEC, specifically 
condemns the practice of smoothing in his speech to the NYU Center for Law and 
Business on September 28, 1998, stating, in reference to reporting abuses, that “trickery 
is employed to obscure actual financial volatility…this in turn masks the true 
consequences of management’s decisions.”5 Thus, earnings management that is otherwise 
value increasing may impose costs on shareholders if it is discovered.
Therefore I also predict that, conditional on the observed earnings management 
being inefficient,
H1b: The association between wealth sensitivity to stock price and earnings 
management is decreasing in strength of corporate governance.
H2b: Use of income-increasing management around stock sales declines in 
strength of corporate governance.
H3b: Use of income-decreasing management preceding option grants and stock 
purchases declines in strength of corporate governance.
4 SEC rule 32-41987 dated January 10, 2000 available at www.sec.gov.
5 Available at www.sec.gov.
30
Chapter 4: Empirical Investigation of the Relation between Executive 
Wealth Sensitivity to Stock Price Changes and Earnings Management
Three sets of hypotheses were developed in Chapter 3. This chapter presents the 
research design and findings for hypotheses 1a and 1b which predict an association 
between executive wealth sensitivity and earnings management, as well as the expected 
influence of corporate governance quality on this association.
H1a: Income-increasing or income-smoothing earnings management is positively 
associated with executive wealth sensitivity to stock price.
H1b: The association between wealth sensitivity to stock price and earnings 
management is decreasing in strength of corporate governance.
4.1 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA 
I test my hypotheses using a sample of corporate CEOs and CFOs drawn from the 
Standard & Poor’s 1500 firms as of January 1995. CEOs and CFOs are chosen because 
they have both the ability and opportunity to influence financial reports.6
The sample selection procedure is summarized as follows. First, financial firms, 
firms in regulated industries, and real estate investment trusts are eliminated because they 
are likely to have unique incentives to manage earnings and/or their balance sheet 
structure is not suited to the abnormal accruals model used to construct the dependent 
variables. Second, firms lacking required non-compensation data are dropped from the 
sample. 
Third, firms without an adequate time series of proxy filings are also eliminated. 
Measurement of option-based wealth sensitivity to stock price changes requires vesting 
data which I construct using a time series of compensation disclosures from annual proxy 
6 This is substantiated by the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 requirement that both CEOs and CFOs of public 
companies certify that their firms’ financial statements are not misleading.
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statements. Beginning with filings for fiscal 1992, the SEC expanded proxy disclosure 
requirements related to compensation and equity ownership of the five most highly 
compensated executives of public companies. The necessary option grant data is not 
generally available prior to this time. Firms that do not have proxy filings extending back 
to 1993 (filings for 1992) are dropped from the potential sample pool. 
A sample of 410 firms is randomly selected from the firms that remain after these 
eliminations. The resulting sample consists of 1661 (1249) firm-year observations 
representing 410 (304) distinct firms with 475 (330) unique CEOs (CFOs) for the four 
year period 1996 through 1999. A number of the sample firms do not include CFOs 
among the top five executives, resulting in a reduced sample size for CFOs. Executive 
equity holdings and governance data are collected for 1996 through 1999. Financial data 
cover 1996 to 2000.
4.1.1 Measures of Earnings Management
My primary earnings management proxy for tests of Hypothesis 1 is annual 
discretionary current accruals. Discretionary, or abnormal, accruals are identified using 
an accruals expectation model based on the cross-sectional version of the Jones model 
used by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), as modified by Beneish (1998).7
I estimate industry- and period- specific parameters by regressing current accruals 
on net income and change in cash sales for each firm i in period t. Equation (1a) is 
estimated for each two digit SIC code and calendar period combination using all 
Compustat industrial firms, except the sample firms, with annual sales and total assets 
7 DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) use the Dechow (1995) modification of the Jones model which regresses 
accruals on change in sales to estimate the model parameters but uses change in sales less change in 
accounts receivable in the prediction model. Beneish (1998) points out that abnormal accruals are likely to 
be overstated when sales are used for estimation, but adjusted sales for prediction, and that the economic 
meaning of the prediction model sales proxy, which is equivalent to cash sales minus prior period accrual 
sales, is ambiguous. In order to capture revenue based earnings management, I use change in cash sales in 
both the estimation and prediction models.
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falling in the same size ranges as those of the sample firms. Industries are classified 
according to Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1998), hereafter referred to as BBL SIC 
codes). 
(1a)120 1 εNIγ∆CSγγCA itititit +++= −
where CAit are current accruals for firm i in period t, NIit-1 is lagged net income 
(Compustat item 172), and ∆CSit is change in cash sales from period t-1 to period t. All 
variables including the intercept are scaled by t-1 total assets (Compustat item 6).  
Current accruals equal the difference between net working capital at period-end t
and net working capital at period-end t-1, where net working capital is computed as the 
sum of accounts receivable (Compustat item 2), inventory (Compustat item 3), and other 
current assets (Compustat item 68) less the sum of accounts payable (Compustat item 
70), accrued tax liabilities (Compustat item 71) and other current liabilities (Compustat 
item 72).8 Change in cash sales is equal to the cash collections for period t less the cash 
collections for period t-1. Cash collections are sales minus the change in accounts 
receivable.
Since my partitioning variable, executive wealth sensitivity, is likely to be 
correlated with firm performance, I include lagged return on assets, calculated as prior 
period net income divided by beginning total assets, to control for firm performance. 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2002) find use of performance matched discretionary 
accruals improves the specification of earnings management tests by controlling for the 
8 Hribar and Collins (2002) recommend use of changes in working capital accounts from the statement of 
cash flows in accrual estimation models because balance sheet accruals are not consistently adjusted for the 
influence of mergers and acquisitions, divestitures and/or foreign currency translation. However, statement 
of cash flow amounts are often missing in Compustat records. Accordingly, I use balance sheet working 
capital changes and eliminate firms with changes in working capital exceeding 25% of total assets from the 
accruals estimation sample.
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effects of firm performance on accruals. They find the second best model is one that 
includes lagged return on assets as a regressor. Because performance matching would 
require extensive additional hand collection of data, I use the latter alternative.
The industry- and period- specific parameter estimates obtained from equation 
(1a) are used to predict the expected accruals, E[CA], for each sample firm using equation 
(1b).  Abnormal accruals (EM) are the difference between predicted and actual accruals 
as specified in equation (1c). Consistent with the estimation procedure, all terms are 










The difference between the actual and predicted accruals, EM, is assumed to be 
discretionary, or “abnormal” accruals. For tests of hypotheses 1a and 1b I first use the 
absolute value of abnormal accruals (|EM|) to look for evidence of a relation between 
equity-based wealth sensitivity and unsigned abnormal accrual magnitude. To gain 
insights into the specific nature of the earnings management, I then examine the 
associations of the wealth sensitivity measures with positive and negative abnormal 
accruals. Abnormal accruals may be used to manage earnings in two ways. First, positive 
abnormal accruals (EM+) may be used to increase earnings or to avoid negative earnings 
surprises. Second, negative abnormal accruals (EM—) may be used to create reserves for 
future use or to avoid positive earnings surprises. In addition, the accrual measurement 
model is likely to generate negative (positive) abnormal accruals as prior period positive 
(negative) abnormal accruals reverse.
I replicate my empirical tests using two alternative abnormal accruals measures. 
The first measure is total abnormal accruals, calculated using equation (2a) to estimate 
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the industry-period parameters, equation (2b) to compute the expected total accruals for 
the sample firms and equation (2c) to measure discretionary total accruals. The chief 
advantage of this model is that total accruals are measured using income statement and 
cash flow statement measures, helping to mitigate the measurement error associated with 
balance sheet amounts described in Hribar and Collins (2002). On the other hand, 
manipulation of non-current accruals, which are dominated by depreciation, is transparent 




















where TAit are total accruals for firm i in period t, ∆REVit is the difference between 
revenues (Compustat item 12) in periods t and t-1, PPEit refers to gross property, plant 
and equipment (Compustat item 7) and NIit-1 is lagged net income. Total accruals are 
computed as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat item 
123) and cash flow from operations (Compustat 308) adjusted for cash flow from 
discontinued operations (Compustat 124). As before, all variables including the intercept 
are scaled by t-1 total assets. 
The second alternate abnormal accruals measure employs a cross-sectional model 
with the Dechow (1995) modification of the Jones model for current accruals. The 
Dechow (1995) modification uses change in accrual sales in parameter estimation, and 
the change in accrual sales adjusted by the change in accounts receivable to calculate 
expected accruals. I also drop the return on assets term from both the estimation and 
measurement models for this final abnormal accruals model. 
Results using both alternatives are qualitatively similar to those obtained with the 
primary model. In general, the statistics for most test variables improve for the Dechow 
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modification, suggesting either improved specification or correlation between the 
regressors and model measurement error.
4.1.2 Measures of Wealth Sensitivity
I expect the change in firm value for a given level of executive earnings 
management effort to increase in firm size. In particular, I assume a given level of 
earnings-management effort results in a relatively constant percentage change in firm 
value across firms and over time. Therefore, my measure of wealth sensitivity is the 
dollar change in the executive’s wealth given a marginal percentage change in stock price 
(Baker and Hall 2003). Total sensitivity is the expected change in the value of an 
executive’s equity holdings, given a one percent change in stock price, where equity 
holdings consist of stock and stock options. Stock-based wealth sensitivity to equity price 
change is equal to the number of shares held by the executive times the stock price times 
0.01 (1.0%). Option-based wealth sensitivity is the change in the value of the CEO’s 
option holdings given a one percent change in stock price.
Consistent with other studies (Hall 1998; Guay 1999; Core and Guay 1999), 
option values are estimated using the Black Scholes option pricing formula, as modified 
by Merton (1973) to adjust for dividend payments. The option vesting schedules, 
maturities and strike prices required for calculating Black Scholes values are collected 
from proxy statements. Options predating 1992 that remain in an executive’s portfolio 
during the study period are assumed to have the same vesting schedule and to be granted 
at the end of the same calendar month as the earliest awards on record for that individual. 
Dividend yields, volatilities and stock prices are calculated using CRSP data, and risk-
free rates (90 day constant maturities) are obtained from the Federal Reserve. Details of 
the Black Scholes calculations are provided in Appendix A. 
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Option-based wealth sensitivity (Option Sensitivity) is computed individually for 
each CEO and CFO of firm i as the sum, over the n grants in an executive’s option 
portfolio, of the Black Scholes delta for each option grant k times the number of options s





















I expect the importance of the wealth effect of a CEO’s equity revaluation to be 
related to how material the revaluation is relative to the CEO’s other sources of income. 
Accordingly, I scale the sensitivity measures by the sum of the executive’s salary and 
bonus. While incentive intensity may be tempered by income from other sources, in light 
of the magnitude of the sample CEOs’ equity holdings in their firms, it is not likely that 
they have sufficient non-firm income-generating assets to materially alter their incentives 
(Baker and Hall 1998). 
I replicate my tests using four alternate transformations of the sensitivity 
measures including the natural log of the sensitivity measures, sensitivity scaled by salary 
alone and sensitivity scaled by the value of the executive's holdings. These three 
measures yield results that are qualitatively to those reported using the salary plus bonus 
deflator. The final measure employed uses the firms’ market value of equity as a deflator 
for the sensitivity measures to approximate the percentage of firm owned measure in 
Cheng and Warfield (2004). I find the sensitivity coefficients are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels for this final alternative; however, this rescaling alters 
the theoretical construct being tested. 
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4.1.3 Measures of Governance Strength
I use governance characteristics that have been shown to influence abnormal 
accrual usage to construct my governance strength variable (Governance Score). These 
characteristics fall into three categories – board structure, ownership structure and 
institutional environment.
The most fundamental responsibility of the board of directors is to monitor the 
actions of corporate executives on behalf of the shareholders. Accordingly, I include 
three measures of board structure in the governance variable. First, the empirical 
literature presents pervasive evidence that outside directors are more effective as 
monitors of management than inside directors so I use the fraction of outside directors as 
one measure of board quality. I consider directors that are employed by the firm, retired 
or former executives, relatives of the CEO, and consultants and attorneys employed by 
the firm as inside directors. All other board members are classified as outside. 
I use board size, measured as the number of directors on the board, as a second 
measure of board quality. Jensen (1993) suggests that large boards are likely to have 
weak governance structures while Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells 
(1998) show that firms with small boards perform better than firms with large boards.9
Finally, active boards are considered better overseers of management than their less 
active counterparts. In particular, Xie, Davidson and DeDalt (2003) document a negative 
relation between earnings management and frequency of board meeting. Number of 
meetings is included as the final board quality measure. Some board data are obtained 
from Execucomp, the balance are hand collected from proxy filings.
9 Jensen also suggests that boards where CEOs serve as chairmen also have weak governance. The majority 
of the sample firms’ CEOs serve as chairmen so this variable is not included in governance score due to the 
limited cross-sectional variation.
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Prior literature reveals that outside blockholders play monitoring roles such that 
firms with influential external owners have stronger governance than those without 
significant investors (Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999). I use the fraction of shares 
owned by institutions as a proxy for influential outside ownership. Institutional holdings 
data are obtained from the Thomson Financial Institutional (13F) database. Holdings data 
are not available for 49 firm-years. 
I use the G score developed in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) as my proxy for 
institutional environment, the final characteristic included in the governance measure. 
The G score, which I obtain from Andrew Metrick’s website, is a measure of shareholder 
rights constructed using 24 corporate-governance provisions obtained from the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center. The provisions used to construct the G score fit into five 
categories described by Gompers et al. (2003) as tactics for delaying hostile bidders, 
voting rights, director/officer protection, other takeover defenses, and state laws. While 
the G score theoretically ranges from 0 to 24 with 0 (24) indicating strong (weak) 
shareholder rights and therefore implying strong (weak) governance, the G score for the 
sample firms ranges from 0 to 16. Scores are not available for 340 firm-years.10
I combine these five variables, or factors, into BBL SIC specific composite 
governance proxies as follows. First, I standardize each of the variables (mean 0, variance 
1) by BBL SIC code. Next, I use principal component analysis to identify the first 
principal component, which I use as the basis for my governance measure. The principal 
component analysis generates a factor loading, or weight, for each variable. The product 
of the factor loadings vector with the vector of the factor values for each observation 
generates the governance score variable used in my tests.  To avoid excessive data loss, I 
10 Details regarding the construction of the G score are found in Gompers et al. (2003). For 1998, the last 
period the G score is computed, Gompers et al. (2003) report a score range of 2 to 18, with mean and 
median scores of 8.9 and 9, respectively.
39
replace missing values for institutional holdings and G score with their industry means. 
Results of tests including and excluding the observations with replacement values are not 
materially different.
Table 1 summarizes the correlations between the factors, as well as the factor 
loadings for each industry grouping. The first principal component explains between 
approximately 27% and 50% of the variance in the set of variables. The distributions of 
the loadings on, and simple correlations between, the five governance factors vary by 
BBL SIC, suggesting systematic differences in governance practices across industries. 
4.1.4 Control Variables
Theory and prior empirical research suggest that earnings management is 
associated with a number of factors that are likely to be correlated with equity incentives. 
In order to control for these factors I use multivariate regressions that include the 
variables discussed below. 
Cash bonuses are generally based on accounting measures and have been 
associated with earnings management in previous studies (Healy 1985; Gaver, Gaver and 
Austin 1995; Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan 1995). Bonus income may also be correlated 
with equity incentives since the performance measures on which the bonus is based may 
also have valuation implications. I control for possible bonus effects by including the 
executive’s bonus scaled by the sum of salary and bonus. 
Compensation policy and earnings management are both associated with firm 
size. Executive actions are less observable and corporate governance tends to be stronger 
for large complex businesses, suggesting that incentive based compensation is more 
intensive for large firms than for small firms. In addition, large firms are priced more 
efficiently than small firms (Lakonishok and Lee 2001) and have richer information 
environments both of which imply smaller rewards to earnings managements. The proxy 
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I use to control for firm size is the natural logarithm of the beginning of period market 
value of equity. Also, since marginally profitable firms are more likely to use abnormal 
accruals (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997) I include return on assets to control for firm 
profitability.
Firm growth is also strongly linked to both equity incentive use and earnings 
management. Management of investment opportunities is particularly difficult to monitor 
so firms with growth opportunities are more incentive intense (Kedia and Mozumdar 
2002; Smith and Watts 1992). In addition, growth opportunities are associated with high 
price to earnings multiples, increasing the potential valuation impact of earnings 
management. Finally, use of accruals to manage earnings is less transparent for firms 
with dynamic financial performance and the reversal of managed accruals is masked by 
growth. I use the market to book ratio, computed as the market value of common equity 
divided by the book value of common equity, as my proxy for growth opportunities. 
Empirical research documents that firms with financing needs and firms 
approaching debt covenant default triggers have higher levels of abnormal accruals 
(Healy and Wahlen 1999), a higher incidence of GAAP violations (Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney 1996) and a higher likelihood of committing accounting fraud (Erickson, 
Hanlon and Maydew 2003). To control for financing related earnings management I 
include debt to total assets in my regressions. 
Finally, I include stock volatility, measured as the annualized standard deviation 
of the natural logarithm of stock returns for the last 120 trading days of the fiscal year, to 
control for risk. Both wealth sensitivity and abnormal accruals are related to risk. Risk 
impacts wealth sensitivity through its effect on cost of capital, through Black Scholes 
option values and through the relation between risk and compensation structure. In 
addition, return volatility is positively correlated with earnings volatility (Lev and 
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Kinutzky 1974; Thomas and Zhang 2002) which could influence abnormal accruals in 
two ways. First, earnings swings are likely to increase abnormal accruals due to 
measurement error. Second, volatile earnings are costly and may motivate use of accruals 
to produce a smoother earnings pattern. Appendix B provides definitions for all variables 
used.
4.1.5 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the sample firms (Panels A and B) and their executives 
(Panel C) are presented in Table 2. Panel A of Table 2 shows the breakdown of 
observations by industry. The largest concentration of observations comes from durable 
manufacturers followed by retailers. Pharmaceutical and computer related businesses 
comprise approximately 18% of the sample. 
As shown in Panel B, the sample firms are relatively large with a mean (median) 
market value of equity of $10.6 ($1.9) billion, and profitable with mean (median) return 
on assets of 6.5% (7.2%). My selection process favors large firms with stable operations 
since I require firms in continuous operation from 1992 through 2000. Any resulting 
selection bias may limit generalizability of my findings to other firms, but should not 
compromise my inferences which are based strictly on within-sample comparisons. 
Consistent with their financial characteristics, institutional ownership of the 
sample firms is considerable. On average, 62% of the outstanding common shares is held 
by institutional investors.  The sample mean G score of 8.53 is lower than mean of 8.9 
found by Gompers et al. (1998), indicating my sample has somewhat stronger 
shareholder protection than the population of rated firms as a whole.
Panel C of Table 2 summarizes compensation levels and wealth sensitivities for 
the CEOs and CFOs. For CEOs, the average annual cash compensation (salary plus 
bonus) is slightly more than $1.2 million while the median is approximately $946 
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thousand. All but 24 (34) of the CEOs hold shares of stock (options) and less than one-
quarter own restricted stock at some point during the four-period period with the 
incidence of restricted ownership concentrated in 1999. Due to the high frequency of zero 
values, restricted stock-based wealth sensitivity is not separately examined in my 
empirical tests, but is included as a component of stock-based wealth sensitivity.
Both mean and median wealth sensitivities for the CEOs are substantial. The 
average (median) executive’s wealth changes by $766 ($206) thousand when the firm’s 
stock price moves 1%.  The wealth sensitivity effects of options exceed those of stock at 
each quartile break; however, a limited number of executives with large stock holdings 
drive the mean stock-based wealth sensitivity to a higher value than the mean for option-
based wealth sensitivity. 
The CFOs earn approximately one-half the salary and one-third the bonus income 
of CEOs. The most striking differences between the executive types are in their equity 
holdings and wealth sensitivity measures. The average number of shares owned by a CFO 
is less than two percent of the CEO amount. CFO option holdings are also markedly 
smaller than CEO option holdings. However, CFO option holdings exceed their stock 
holdings and provide the dominant source of CFO wealth sensitivity. 
Mean equity holdings and wealth sensitivities of both CEOs and CFOs are heavily 
influenced by values at the upper ends of the distributions. Accordingly, I winsorize the 
sensitivity values used in the following empirical tests at the 95th percentile.
4.2 EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
The objectives of the following analyses are to determine if abnormal accruals are 
systematically related to executive wealth sensitivity, whether corporate governance 
quality influences this relation, and whether the characteristics of the abnormal accrual 
patterns are consistent with income-increasing and/or income-smoothing. In section 4.2.1 
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I examine the correlations between absolute abnormal accruals and wealth sensitivity, 
and absolute abnormal accruals and governance. I then examine the relation between 
wealth sensitivity and abnormal accrual magnitudes and the influence of governance on 
the relation using a multivariate model that controls for other factors that may be related 
to abnormal accruals or executive wealth sensitivity; these tests and results are described 
in section 4.2.2. In Section 4.2.3 I expand the analysis of Section 4.2.2 by separately 
examining positive and negative abnormal accruals. Finally, Section 4.2.4 presents tests 
for income-smoothing. 
Prior to performing the following analyses, I standardize all variables by 
executive type and industry. The formula to compute the standardized values 
is ( )
jxjijij
s/xxx −=′ , where xij' represents the standardized value of the variable x for 
observation i, jx  represents the mean of x for industry j, and jxs  is the standard deviation 
of x for industry j. This standardization serves three purposes: First, it transforms the 
limited dependent variables - |EM|, EM+ and EM– - to variables with infinite support; 
second, it controls for inter-industry heterogeneity; and third, it provides regression 
coefficients that are comparable across regressors. Unless otherwise noted, all variables 
in the following discussions are standardized.
4.2.1 Univariate Relations
I first evaluate whether abnormal accruals vary with wealth sensitivity by 
examining a plot of the relation between total sensitivity quintile and abnormal accruals. 
Total sensitivity is the effect of a 1% change in period t ending stock price on executive 
wealth. Abnormal accruals are measured using a cross-sectional Jones model, as 
described in section 4.1.1. Because I am interested in evaluating wealth sensitivity as a 
potential incentive for earnings management, my sensitivity measures are calculated at 
the end of period t while my abnormal accruals are measured in period t+1.
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 Since the abnormal accrual measures have been standardized, the sample mean 
has a value of zero. Figure 1 shows that absolute abnormal accruals are slightly below 
sample means for the four lowest sensitivity groups, but markedly higher than the sample 
mean for the highest sensitivity group. The pattern for positive abnormal accruals closely 
parallels that for absolute abnormal accruals. Positive abnormal accruals are below the 
sample mean for low sensitivities, near the sample mean for moderate sensitivities and 
above the mean for high sensitivities. Negative abnormal accruals are generally higher 
than the mean (i.e. smaller in magnitude than the mean) except at the high end of the 
wealth sensitivity distribution where they are well below average. 
In addition, the sensitivity-abnormal accrual relations appear to be non-linear. 
While CEO abnormal accruals appear to vary systematically with total sensitivity, visual 
evaluation of the plot for CFOs reveals little evidence of a pattern, although abnormal 
accrual magnitudes appear to be smallest for the highest sensitivity quintile.
Next, I examine the simple correlations between variables. The correlation matrix 
appears in Table 3. Pearson correlations for CEOs (CFOs) appear above (below) the 
diagonal. I do not tabulate the rank correlations; however, the Spearman correlations 
generally yield the same sign, relative magnitude and level of statistical significance as 
the Pearson measures. 
If wealth sensitivity to stock price motivates executives to manage earnings using 
abnormal accruals, I expect to observe significant correlations between total sensitivity 
and the magnitude of abnormal accruals. Table 3 reports a Pearson correlation of 0.0878 
(p=0.0103) between absolute abnormal accruals and CEO total sensitivity consistent with 
the prediction that abnormal accrual usage increases in CEO wealth sensitivity; however, 
the magnitude of the correlation is small. The abnormal accrual-wealth sensitivity 
correlation is negative, but not statistically significant for CFOs.
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Prior research documents a negative association between abnormal accrual levels 
and governance strength. I find a negative correlation between abnormal accruals and 
governance score, consistent with governance serving as a constraint to manipulation of 
earnings through use of accruals. Furthermore, the magnitude of the correlation between 
governance and abnormal accruals suggests a stronger relation than that between total 
wealth sensitivity and abnormal accruals. 
Based on my discussion in section 4.1.4 of the various control variables, I expect 
the earnings management to decrease in firm size. As expected, abnormal accruals are 
negatively correlated with market capitalization. The expected relation between return on 
assets (ROA) and abnormal accruals is less clear. First, if highly profitable firms have 
fewer incentives to manage earnings, the correlation between ROA and abnormal 
accruals will be negative. On the hand, if abnormal accruals are used to meet target ROA 
then abnormal accrual magnitudes might increase in ROA resulting in a positive 
correlation with abnormal accruals. Finally, if abnormal accrual measurement error is 
correlated with profitability, the correlation between abnormal accruals and ROA will 
also be positive. The observed correlations for the CEO sample are consistent with both 
the measurement error and earnings management explanations.
I expect market to book to be positively correlated with abnormal accruals since 
the rewards to earnings management increase in market to book. Because market to book 
is associated with earnings growth, if the abnormal accruals measurement model does not 
fully adjust for growth, the abnormal accruals will be positively biased which could 
induce a positive correlation between market to book and the values of both positive and 
negative abnormal accruals. The impact on absolute abnormal accruals is ambiguous 
since the positive accruals will have greater magnitudes but the negative accruals will 
have smaller magnitudes. On the other hand, if earnings management is directly related to 
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growth, the magnitudes of both positive and negative abnormal accruals will be larger 
generating a positive correlation between absolute abnormal accruals and the market to 
book ratio, as observed for the CEO sample. While directionally consistent with this 
pattern, the CFO correlation is not statistically significant.
The expected correlation between absolute abnormal accruals and debt to assets is 
not clear. The use of income-increasing earnings management to avoid default triggers is 
expected to increase in leverage; but I expect either a negative relation or no relation 
between negative abnormal accrual magnitudes and leverage. Contrary to expectations, 
debt to assets is negatively correlated with abnormal accruals suggesting that earnings 
management is less prevalent among the high leverage firms than the low leverage firms. 
4.2.2 Multivariate Tests 
The multivariate regressions test the relation between the wealth sensitivity and 
abnormal accruals, examine the effect of corporate governance on this relation, and 
control for other determinants of abnormal accruals that are likely to be correlated with 
equity incentives. In addition, the specifications include squared wealth sensitivity terms 
to accommodate potential non-linearity in the abnormal accrual-sensitivity relation. For 
consistency of exposition, discussion of CEO results precedes discussion of CFO results 
for each regression analysis.
4.2.2.1 Abnormal accruals and Executive wealth sensitivity
The first multivariate regression examines the relation between total wealth 


















where EMit+1 = represents absolute abnormal accruals (|EM|) for the period following the 
measurement of wealth sensitivity 
Total Sensitivityit = total wealth sensitivity, which is equal to the effect of a 1% 
change in period t ending stock price on the equity-based wealth of firm i’s CEO 
scaled by the sum of salary and bonus 
2
itTS  = the square of Total Sensitivity
Bonusit= the bonus compensation received by the executive of firm i in period t 
scaled by the sum of salary and bonus
Sizeit = the natural logarithm of period t ending market value of equity
ROAit= net income for firm i divided by period t ending total assets
MTBit = firm i’s ending market value of equity divided by book value
DTAit = the ratio of period-end total liabilities to total assets
Stock Volatilityit = the annualized standard deviation of the natural logarithm of 
stock returns for the last 120 trading days of the fiscal year
The primary coefficient of interest is α1, the coefficient on Total Sensitivity. If 
increasing sensitivity of wealth to stock price motivates executives to increase earnings 
through accrual manipulations I expect α1 to be positive.
The results of pooled cross-sectional regressions are provided under the heading 
Equation (4) in Panel A of Table 4.  The first column presents results for the regression of 
absolute abnormal accruals on CEO total sensitivity and the control variables. Total 
sensitivity is important in explaining variation in abnormal accruals with the magnitude 
of abnormal accruals increasing with total wealth sensitivity. The coefficient on the 
squared sensitivity term is opposite in sign from that on total sensitivity implying 
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abnormal accrual magnitudes increase at a decreasing rate with total sensitivity. The 
results are consistent with accrual manipulation.
In addition to my variables of interest, all control variables are significantly 
associated with the abnormal accrual measures. As predicted, the signs on the coefficients 
for size are consistent with abnormal accrual magnitudes decreasing in size. The relations 
of ROA and market to book with abnormal accruals agree with the simple correlations 
and suggest that profitability and growth are positively associated with abnormal accrual 
magnitudes. 
In the presence of the remaining control variables, the coefficient on debt to assets 
assumes the expected positive sign consistent with prior research suggesting that 
financing needs and potential debt covenant violations serve as incentives to use accrual 
manipulations to manage earnings (Healy and Wahlen 1999). Finally, since volatility is a 
potential incentive for income-smoothing, I expect and find a significant coefficient on 
the volatility measure.
Results for regression of absolute abnormal accruals on CFO total sensitivity are 
tabulated in the second column of Panel A. No significant relations are observed. While 
directionally consistent with the CEO results, the coefficients on the control variables are 
not uniformly significant.
4.2.2.2 Effect of governance on CEO wealth sensitivity - abnormal accruals relation
Next I consider the effect of governance on the relation between abnormal 
accruals and total sensitivity by incorporating the governance variable, Governance 
score, and a wealth sensitivity-governance interaction term, TS*G, into equation (4). This 
expanded model appears below in equation (5). 
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Governance Score, as described in section 4.1.3, represents a measure of 
governance strength constructed from multiple governance characteristics using principal 
component analysis, and TS*G represents the interaction between Total Sensitivity and 
Governance Score.
If the relation between CEO wealth sensitivity and abnormal accruals decreases in 
governance quality, the signs for the coefficient on the interaction term, α2, will be the 
opposite of the predicted sign for α1.  Results are reported under the heading Equation (5) 
in Panel B of Table 4. The coefficient on TS*G, while directionally consistent with 
prediction, is not significant. The results suggest that wealth driven incentives to 
manipulate accruals are not influenced by governance strength; however, the coefficient 
on governance score, α4, confirms the simple correlation results and suggests abnormal 
accrual use declines in governance quality. Coefficients on the control variables are 
consistent with those found in prior regressions. 
In total these findings imply that while governance alone appears to mitigate 
earnings management (i.e. α4 is negative), strong governance does not appear to reduce 
the tendency of high sensitivity CEOs to use abnormal accruals (i.e. α2 is not significant). 
Addition of the governance terms has little impact on CFO regression results. No 
significant relations are found between abnormal accruals and Total Sensitivity, TS*G or 
Governance Score for the CFO sample.
4.2.2.3 Wealth sensitivity effects related to stock and option holdings
Stock and options have different incentive effects. For example, stock ownership 






















suggests that firms use options to provide risk-taking incentives (Core, Guay and Larcker 
2003). In addition, Guay (1999) shows that stock return volatility can have a material 
effect on CEO option-based wealth sensitivity but little or no effect on stock-based 
wealth sensitivity. Consequently, incentives to manage earnings may vary depending on 
the equity instruments held. In order to allow for such potential variation Total Sensitivity
is decomposed into stock-based wealth sensitivity, the portion of Total Sensitivity
generated by stock holdings, and option-based wealth sensitivity, measured as the change 
in the Black Scholes value of the executive’s option portfolio given a 1% change in stock 
price. The regression model detailed in equation (6), is the same as equation (5) except 
each of the sensitivity terms – Total Sensitivity, TS*G and TS2 - are replaced with their 
separate stock-based (Stock Sensitivity, SS*G, SS2) and option-based (Option Sensitivity, 
OS*G, OS2) counterparts. 
Results summarized in Panel C of Table 4 reveal the relations between the CEO 
total sensitivity variable and abnormal accruals found in the prior specifications are 
driven by the stock component as evidenced by the statistical significance of α1, the 
coefficient on stock-based wealth sensitivity. The coefficient value implies that a one 
standard deviation change in stock-based wealth sensitivity results in an approximately 
one-quarter standard deviation shift in abnormal accrual magnitude. As before, the 
coefficient on the stock sensitivity–governance interaction term is not significant, and the 
coefficient on the stock sensitivity squared term is negative. Coefficients on the test 

























CEO option-based wealth sensitivity does not explain variation in absolute 
abnormal accruals. The lack of findings may result if vested and unvested options 
generate opposing incentives. For example, vested options may be readily liquidated 
while unvested options expose an executive’s wealth to longer-term firm performance. I 
conduct one more multivariate regression with option-based wealth sensitivity separated 
into vested and unvested portions. I define vested options as options that are vested at 
period t fiscal period-end plus options that will vest during period t+1. All other options 
are classified as unvested. Option Sensitivity, OS*G and OS2 are replaced with their 
separate vested (Vested Sensitivity, VS*G, VS2) and unvested (Unvested Sensitivity, 
US*G, US2) components as shown in equation (7):
Results of the regressions appear under the heading Equation (7) in Panel D of 
Table 4. The relation between the stock-based wealth sensitivity variables and abnormal 
accruals remain unchanged from the prior tests. The coefficients on both the vested and 
unvested sensitivity terms are insignificant. The regressions for the CFOs continue to 
yield few significant results. 
In summary, the regressions show that CEO total equity-based wealth sensitivity 
is positively associated with abnormal accrual magnitudes, the association is primarily 
due to the sensitivity arising from stock holdings, and the relation is not materially 


































Section 4.2.3 Multivariate Tests using Positive and Negative Abnormal Accruals
In order to further characterize the nature of the abnormal accrual usage, I run 
separate regressions for the two dependent variables – positive abnormal accruals (EM+) 
and negative abnormal accruals (EM-). Regressions using the models specified in 
Equations (4) through (7) are repeated with results reported in Panels A through D, 
respectively, of Table 5. The discussion in this section is limited to the results using the 
Equation (7) regression model. 
The primary coefficients of interest are α1, α4, α7, the coefficients on Total 
Sensitivity, Vested Sensitivity and Unvested Sensitivity. If increasing sensitivity of 
executive wealth to stock price motivates income-increasing earnings management I 
expect α1, α4, and α7 to be positive for regressions of positive abnormal accruals on the 
sensitivity measures. Similarly, reserving of income and/or the reversal of positive 
abnormal accruals will result in negative values for α1, α4, and α7 in regressions of 
negative abnormal accruals on sensitivity. Finally, if the relation between wealth 
sensitivity and abnormal accruals decreases in governance quality, the signs for the 
coefficients on the interaction terms, α2, α5, and α8, will be the opposite of the predicted 
signs for α1, α4, and α7.  
Panel D of Table 5 reveals that stock sensitivity is important in explaining 
variation in both positive and negative abnormal accruals, and the signs on the 
coefficients are consistent with predictions that the magnitude of abnormal accruals 
increases with stock-based wealth sensitivity.  Furthermore, the coefficient values suggest 
the relation with stock-based wealth sensitivity is similar for positive and negative 
abnormal accruals. As before, the coefficients on the squared sensitivity terms are 
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opposite in sign from those on total sensitivity implying abnormal accrual magnitudes 
increase at a decreasing rate with total sensitivity. The coefficient on SS*G, while 
directionally consistent with prediction for the regression with positive abnormal 
accruals, is not significant suggesting that wealth driven incentives to manipulate accruals 
are not influenced by governance strength. However, Governance score alone does 
appear to be related to abnormal accrual usage. In particular, Governance score is 
negatively related to income-increasing abnormal accruals but is not significantly related 
to income-decreasing abnormal accrual levels. These results are consistent with Peasnell, 
Pope and Young (2000) who find the likelihood of managers making income-increasing 
accruals is negatively related to board independence, but find little evidence that 
independence influences income-decreasing accruals. Coefficients on the control 
variables are consistent with those found in prior regressions. 
As before, the coefficients on the vested option-based sensitivity terms are 
insignificant; however, unvested option-based wealth sensitivity is directly related to 
income-increasing abnormal accruals, and governance appears to attenuate the effect. 
CEOs with relatively high unvested option-based sensitivity may be comprised of 
executives with short tenure in the CEO position whose firm wealth is dominated by 
options granted upon assumption of the chief executive post, or may be CEOs who 
receive options as a substitute for cash compensation, own few shares, and sell options as 
they vest for consumption purposes. Preliminary findings show the executives with high 
unvested holdings do have shorter mean tenures and more frequent equity sales consistent 
with both explanations. The regressions for the CFOs continue to yield few significant 
results.
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In summary, the regressions show that total, stock-based and unvested option-
based sensitivities are associated with greater magnitudes of abnormal accruals, and 
except for the CEO unvested option-based wealth sensitivity, the relations are not 
materially influenced by governance strength. In addition, the similarity in values for 
coefficients on stock-based wealth sensitivity for both regressands is consistent with 
income-smoothing.
Section 4.2.4 Tests of Income-Smoothing 
In this section, I examine whether the observed relations between CEO 
sensitivities and abnormal accruals can be characterized as income-smoothing. Since the 
univariate tests and regression analyses for CFOs provide no evidence of a relation 
between abnormal accruals and wealth sensitivity, I limit the smoothing tests to the CEO 
sample. 
The significant association of both positive and negative abnormal accruals with 
CEO wealth sensitivity and the similarity in magnitude of the regression coefficients 
suggest the possibility of smoothing but could also arise in a variety of non-smoothing 
settings. Smoothing involves the shifting of earnings over time to eliminate extreme 
realizations of reported income. Therefore, if CEO wealth sensitivity provides an 
incentive to smooth earnings I expect, conditional on high magnitudes of abnormal 
accruals, firms with high sensitivity CEOs to have less earnings variability than firms 
with low sensitivity CEOs. I conduct two tests to evaluate smoothing.
4.2.3.1 Cross-sectional test of smoothing
My first test examines the cross-sectional relation between wealth sensitivity 
measures and magnitude of earnings surprises when earnings expectations are based on 
past earnings trends. On average, smoothed earnings should have smaller surprises than 
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unsmoothed earnings when earnings expectations are based on past earnings. I use a 
random walk with drift earnings generating process to model expected earnings. The drift 
term (δ) is estimated based on the average annual growth in income before extraordinary 
items (Compustat data item 18) for the five years preceding the estimation. Expected 
earnings (E(υ)), are computed as E(υt) = υt-1 * (1 +δ), where δ is the earnings growth rate. 
Earnings surprise is the absolute value of the difference between actual and expected 
earnings scaled by expected earnings. Earnings surprise is standardized by BBL SIC to 
mean 0, variance 1. 
To assess whether earnings surprise varies systematically across sensitivities 
conditional on use of abnormal accruals to manage earnings, I select the one-third of the 
sample with highest abnormal accruals to reduce the likelihood that the smoothness of the 
series is transaction-based. Prior to testing for smoothing I first examine the distribution 
of abnormal accruals across sensitivities for this sub-sample. To do so, I divide the 
observations into terciles based on sensitivity value and calculate mean abnormal 
accruals. The first two columns in Panel A of Table 6 document the means for the 
standardized positive and negative abnormal accruals, respectively. The high total and 
high stock-based wealth sensitivity groups have significantly larger mean positive 
abnormal accruals than the respective low sensitivity groups. High stock-based wealth 
sensitivity is also associated with larger magnitudes of negative abnormal accruals. 
Patterns of abnormal accruals across option-based wealth sensitivities vary from 
those for total and stock-based wealth sensitivities. Abnormal accrual magnitudes 
decrease in option-based wealth sensitivity and the negative abnormal accruals 
magnitudes are significantly smaller at high sensitivities than at low sensitivities. 
Furthermore, mean positive and negative abnormal accrual magnitudes are considerably 
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smaller for high option-based wealth sensitivities than for high stock-based wealth 
sensitivities. 
Turning to my variable of interest, I examine mean earnings surprise by wealth 
sensitivity. Earnings surprise decreases in total and stock-based wealth sensitivities but 
not option-based wealth sensitivity. I confirm this result by carrying out three univariate 
regressions of standardized absolute earnings surprise on total, stock-based and option-
based wealth sensitivities. The coefficients on the sensitivity measures should be negative 
if earnings surprise decreases in wealth sensitivity. The results of the univariate 
regressions, summarized in Panel B of Table 6, show that earnings surprise decreases in 
total and stock sensitivities but there is no evidence of a significant relation with option-
based wealth sensitivity. Taken as a whole, these findings show that, conditional on large 
accrual magnitudes income-smoothing increases in stock-based wealth sensitivity but 
option-based wealth sensitivity does not appear to motivate smoothing. 
4.2.3.2 Time series test of smoothing
The second test for smoothing examines the variability of the residuals from firm-
specific time-series regressions of net income on time. The test assumes that over 
relatively short horizons, in this case 5 years, earnings follow a trend process with mean 
reversion.11,12 The regression in equation (8) is estimated by firm for the one-third of the 
sample firms with the highest average magnitudes of abnormal accruals over the period 
1997-2000.13
(8)10 tIncomeNet tt ε+α+α=
11 Thomas and Zhang (2002) calculate 12 year earnings volatilities using both trend and seasonal random 
walk models; they find the measures perform the same in their tests and are highly correlated ( =0.834).
12 While it is well documented that earnings follow a seasonal random walk over long horizons, it is 
unlikely that deliberate smoothing would result in a seasonal random walk over short horizons.
13 Since my primary tests evaluate wealth sensitivity as an incentive for earnings management, the 
abnormal accruals are estimated for the fiscal period subsequent to the sensitivity measurement; sensitivity 
measures are computed for the period 1996-1999, abnormal accruals are estimated for 1997-2000.
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where Net Income is net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
(Compustat data item 18), and t is time which ranges from 1 for fiscal 1996 to 5 for fiscal 
2000. I use net income before extraordinary items because analysts and the financial 
press focus on this measure; thus, it is more likely to be the objective of smoothing than 
net income after extraordinary items. I include the additional period to provide five data 
points for each regression and use only firms whose CEOs do not change during the four 
year period 1996-1999.
I compare the average of the firm-specific coefficients of variation from 
regressions using equation (8) across sensitivity ranks. Total, stock and option-based 
wealth sensitivity ranks for the high abnormal accrual sub-sample are based on average 
sensitivity values over the period 1996-1999. The coefficient of variation is calculated by 
dividing the root mean square error from each firm’s time-series regression by the firm’s 
mean net income and then multiplying this value by one hundred. The results shown in 
Panel C of Table 6 show the variance in the regression residuals declines with total and 
stock-based wealth sensitivity, corroborating the cross-sectional findings that smoothness 
of earnings is positively related to total and stock sensitivities. 
In combination, these findings are consistent with high stock-based, but not 
option-based, wealth sensitivity motivating managers to reduce risk through income 
smoothing.
4.2.5 Additional Tests
As a robustness check to ensure my results are not driven by one or two periods I 
perform annual regressions using equation (5). The average of the annual coefficients 
from the regressions is examined. The p-values are generally higher than for the pooled 
sample, and they are less than 0.10 for the total and stock-based wealth sensitivity 
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coefficients.14 In addition, because I introduce potential selection bias by separately 
testing positive and negative abnormal accruals I repeat my tests using a Tobit model to 
analyze the relation between abnormal accruals and wealth sensitivity. Results are 
qualitatively similar to those found using OLS.
I also decompose governance into its component measures and repeat my tests 
using each separate measure in lieu of the proxy created using principal components 
analysis. I find none of the individual measures results in significant interaction effects, 
and all the compensation variables except for G score are negatively associated with 
positive abnormal accruals.
Finally, prior research suggests that CEOs nearing retirement may manage 
earnings. Specifically, Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) predict but find no evidence that 
CEOs inflate earnings in their final year to increase payouts under bonus plans. Reitenga 
and Tearney (2003) investigate earnings management by CEOs for four years prior to 
manadatory retirements. They find evidence of earnings management in the last two 
years of the CEOs term and further find that the earnings management was influenced by 
governance characteristics. Because wealth sensitivity is correlated with executive tenure, 
I investigate whether horizon-related effects drive my results. I divide the sample CEOs 
into three groups based on age. The first group is comprised of CEOs aged 65 and older 
(N=173 executive-years), the second group is CEOs who are 63 or 64 (N=122 executive-
years), and the CEOs under 63 form the final group (N=1366 executive-years). I repeat 
the regressions specified in Equation (7) for each group. My results (untabulated) show 
that the smoothing behavior associated with stock-based wealth sensitivity is limited to 
the two younger groups of CEOs, the coefficients on Stock Sensitivity for the two groups 
are similar in magnitude, and that the income-increasing accruals associated with 
14 Significance is determined using t statistics based on the distribution of standard errors for the annual 
coefficients.
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unvested option-based wealth sensitivity is limited to the group consisting of CEOs under 
the age of 63. While these findings suggest executive horizon is not a key determinant of 
the observed earnings management, the low numbers of CEOs in the two older groups 
limit the power of my tests. 
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Chapter 5: Empirical Investigation of Insider Trading as an Incentive 
for Earnings Management
This chapter presents the research design and findings for hypotheses 2a, 2b, 3a, 
and 3b which predict specific relations between executive equity transactions and 
earnings management, and the expected influence of corporate governance quality on 
those relations.
H2a: Income-increasing earnings management is used prior to or following 
executive stock sales.
H2b: Use of income-increasing management around stock sales declines in 
strength of corporate governance.
H3a: Income-decreasing earnings management is used prior to option grants and 
stock purchases.
H3b: Use of income-decreasing management preceding option grants and stock 
purchases declines in strength of corporate governance.
5.1 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA
Tests of hypotheses 2 and 3 use the same sample CEOs and CFOs and many of 
the same empirical measures used for tests of hypotheses 1a and 1b. Additional data 
sources, measures and methodologies are described below. 
5.1.1 Measures of Earnings Management
My primary proxy for earnings management is quarterly discretionary current 
accruals. Because the tests in this section provide an analysis of insider transactions as 
possible incentives to manage earnings, I use quarterly data from the earnings reports 
issued proximate to the insider transactions to construct my abnormal accruals measures. 
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Minimizing the time between abnormal accrual measurement and the executive 
transactions reduces the opportunity for other factors to influence abnormal accrual 
levels. 
Estimation of the quarterly discretionary accruals parallels the methodology for 
annual accruals except it uses quarterly data. Change measures used in calculating 
abnormal accruals using equations (1) and (2) (e.g. change in sales and change in 
accounts receivable) are computed using the year-to-year change for a given fiscal 
quarter. Because seasonal and year-end effects influence quarterly measures, the 
industry-quarter specific parameters are estimated independently for firms with March, 
June, September and December fiscal year-ends. The number of firms with other fiscal 
year-ends is too limited to estimate the required parameters. Therefore, 80 firms are 
dropped from the sample. 
5.1.2 Measures of Insider Trade
Insider trading data for the selected CEOs consist of transactions reported on SEC 
Form 4 obtained from the Thomson Financial Insider database. The sample includes open 
market trades, selected transactions related to employee benefit plans and dispositions of 
shares to the issuer. All data used are for transactions in securities classified by Thomson 
as direct.15
I examine insider trading as a potential motivation for earnings management. I am 
interested in insider sales, purchases and option grants reported over the quarter 
following the earnings report that includes abnormal accruals, with my quarters extending 
between the earnings announcement dates reported by Compustat. I also examine 
abnormal accruals for the six quarter ends following an insider sale in order to evaluate 
15 Thomson defines direct holdings as “equity securities held in the insider’s name, or in the name of a 
broker, bank or nominee on behalf of the insider.” Transactions related to employee benefit plans are grants 
and awards, option exercises, discretionary transactions under purchase plans and payments related to 
option exercises through delivery of securities. 
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whether insiders engage in post-sale earnings management to avoid detection of 
prohibited or questionable insider trading based on propriety knowledge of future 
earnings. 
I use the number of shares underlying each trade or grant as the basis for my 
executive-specific insider trading measures. Shares traded are cumulated by transaction 
type for each quarter. In order to capture the relative importance of a transaction to an 
executive, I scale the number of shares transacted by the number of shares held.16 Finally, 
I standardize the measure by industry-quarter to control for industry- and time-specific 
effects.17
I am interested in abnormal accruals reported in the periods preceding grants, 
purchases and sales, as well as the six quarters subsequent to a sale. In order to isolate the 
specific relations of interest, my univariate tests use executive-quarters where only one 
type of event is recorded. For example, if a stock sale occurs in one of the six quarters 
immediately following another sale, or if a grant occurs in the same period as a sale the 
observation is dropped. Consequently, approximately forty-four percent of the CEO 
transactions and thirty-three percent of the CFO transactions are dropped leaving 4085 
CEO quarters and 3399 CFO quarters with unique events. Furthermore, while the 
findings of Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2002, KHP) suggest the distance between insider 
sales and unfavorable news may extend for up to 9 quarters, the sample of executives 
without conflicting transactions in post-sale periods beyond 6 quarters becomes too small 
to effectively test. The final sample includes 380 (329) unique CEOs (CEO firms) and 
264 (243) unique CFOs (CFO firms).
16 Grants are scaled by the sum of shares owned and options held due to the number of grant receiving 
executives who have minimal stock holdings.
17 An example of an industry effect would be use of options as a substitute for cash compensation by firms 




Descriptive statistics for the executive transactions appear in Table 7. Panel A 
provides statistics that are conditional on the reported transactions taking place, such that 
the average shares underlying option grants represent averages for executive-quarters 
where option grants are reported. Consistent with the compensation distributions the 
mean values are dominated by large transactions. On average, CEOs receive 
approximately three times the number of options as CFOs and buy and sell more shares 
of stock than the CFOs. 
Panel B reveals there are no transactions in nearly one-half of the executive-
quarters, that the most frequent transaction is option grants, followed by stock sales for 
both CEOs and CFOs. The balance between grants and sales is consistent with Ofek and 
Yermack (2000) who document near total selling of shares acquired through option 
exercises by CEOs. While transactions only occur in approximately one-half of the 
executive-quarters, very few of the sample executives report no transactions.
5.2 UNIVARIATE RELATIONS
In this section I evaluate three hypotheses related to earnings management 
surrounding insider transactions. First, I assess whether the sample executives engage in 
income-decreasing accrual manipulations preceding option grants or stock purchases. 
Second, I empirically examine two hypotheses on the timing of income-increasing 
earnings management relative to insider sales. Finally, I determine whether governance 
quality affects transaction-related earnings management. 
Table 8 provides a description of the distributions of abnormal accruals by 
transaction type. The first row of Panel A presents statistics for CEO quarters where no 
transactions are reported and no sales have occurred in the six previous quarters which 
serve as the control against which transaction-related abnormal accruals are compared. 
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As can be seen from the second column of the table, the vast majority of firms are 
included in the control population, and each transaction type contains a fairly broad 
representation of firms relative to the number of observations documented.    
Hypothesis 2 predicts that executives use negative abnormal accruals to depress 
earnings prior to option grants and stock purchases. While the sign for mean abnormal 
accruals for the period prior to option grants is negative, it is not significantly different 
from either zero or the control sample mean. I do however find that abnormal accruals for 
the earnings report immediately preceding CEO stock purchases are on average negative 
and significantly less than the control abnormal accruals. In addition, the frequency of 
positive abnormal accruals for purchasing CEOs is significantly less than the 53.2% 
observed for the control group indicating the frequency of negative accruals is higher 
than normal for the earnings reports preceding CEO stock purchases.
Turning to CEO stock sales, I find no difference between abnormal accruals for 
sale and control groups preceding the sale but do find evidence consistent with post-sale 
income-increasing earnings management in each of the three quarters following the sale. 
My results suggest that positive abnormal accruals are used following but not preceding 
insider stock sales consistent with the findings of Beneish, Press and Vargus (2004, BPV) 
for a sample of firms with subsequent debt covenant defaults. While mean abnormal 
accruals remain positive over the fourth through sixth quarters following the sale, the 
excess over the control is not significant for these periods.
CFO findings generally parallel those for CEOs except for stock purchases. 
Abnormal accruals are significantly positive and greater than the control value prior to 
CFO stock acquisitions. These results are not consistent with predictions but suggest the 
CFOs may use earnings management to signal their private information about positive 
firm prospects.
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 Although my results appear generally consistent with BPV, they differ in several 
respects with studies by Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2003, KHP), and Bartov and 
Mohanram (2004, BM). In particular, KHP find that insider stock sales precede 
unfavorable earnings news by as many as nine quarters. If earnings management is 
employed post-trade to distance the insider sale from the bad news, KHP’s results suggest 
the abnormal accruals should remain positive through at least six quarters; however, I 
find they are only significantly positive for the first three quarters following the sale. 
BM show that large insider option exercises are preceded by abnormally positive 
earnings and followed by poor earnings performance. They conclude that executives 
opportunistically manage pre-exercise earnings to increase cash payouts, but that 
reversals of the pre-exercise overstatements negatively affect the post-exercise period.18
BM focus exclusively on large transactions, reasoning that the incentives for private 
information-based wealth exercise are greatest for them. Accordingly, I partition my 
samples into three equal groups based on transaction size to see if the results vary by size. 
The transaction measures used for size classification are the shares transacted scaled by 
shares owned, standardized for each executive type by BBL SIC code. Size group 
assignment for the post-sale periods is based on the ranking for the period when the sale 
occurred rather than the respective post-sale period.
Abnormal accruals by transaction size are summarized in Table 9 and illustrated 
in Figures 2 and 3. Consistent with the full sample results, pre-grant abnormal accruals 
for CEOs are not significantly negative for any grant size grouping. Breakdown of stock 
purchases by size reveals negative abnormal accruals precede medium and large 
purchases by CEOs, consistent with larger transactions providing stronger earnings 
18 BM assume that all stock acquired through insider option exercises is immediately sold.
66
management incentives. Pre-purchase deflation of earnings may in part explain Seyhun’s 
(1998) findings that stock prices increase over the year following insider purchases. 
The decomposition of CEO sales into size terciles reveals that the positive post-
sale abnormal accruals are concentrated in periods following large transactions. In 
particular abnormal accruals are significantly positive for all six quarters following sales 
that are in the upper third of the sale transaction size distribution. Figure 3 reveals that 
abnormal accrual magnitudes increase in time from sale for large and, to a lesser extent, 
medium sales. Such growth in abnormal accruals is consistent with a build up of accruals 
over time to mask the negative effects of accrual reversals on earnings performance and 
distance the sale from unfavorable earnings news. These findings conflict with BM who 
document negative abnormal accruals in the year following large option exercises. 
Furthermore, poor earnings performance in the period immediately following significant 
insider transactions, as documented in BM, would likely invite regulatory scrutiny 
resulting in substantial risk of discovery of the earnings management. My results are 
more consistent with the protracted time interval between insider sales and disappointing 
earnings news documented by KHP.
Breakdown of CFO transactions into size groupings provides few insights over 
the aggregate results. Abnormal accruals are negative preceding grants to CFOs when the 
grants are small relative to total CFO holdings and are significantly more negative than 
the control (t = 1.42, p=0.10). However, there is no evidence of manipulation prior to 
larger grants. 
The positive pre-purchase abnormal accruals observed for the CFOs appear to be 
concentrated in the large group, although mean values are positive across all transaction 
sizes. Examination of Figure 3 reveals that post-sale abnormal accruals related to large 
sales by CFOs present a pattern similar to those for large sales by CEOs; Table 9 reveals 
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they are only significantly different from control levels in the third through sixth post-
sale quarters. However, the sample sizes for CFOs are small and the lack of significance 
may reflect low power. 
5.3 REGRESSION ANALYSIS
While the univariate results suggest that large insider transactions serve as 
incentives to opportunistically manage earnings, they might also reflect systematic 
variance of the equity transactions with firm characteristics such as growth, volatility and 
leverage that are associated with abnormal accruals. I investigate this possibility through 
use of regression analysis that controls for factors likely to be associated with both 
abnormal accruals and equity transactions. These are the same control variables used in 
the sensitivity regressions and are described in section 4.1.4; however, the financial 
variables are constructed using quarterly data. As before, control variables are 
standardized to a mean of zero and variance of one by BBL SIC code and fiscal period to 
control for industry and time effects.
The dependent variable for the regressions is abnormal accruals (EM) constructed 
using the variation of the cross-sectional modified Jones model described in section 4.1.1. 
Because the abnormal accruals for these tests are not separated by sign, standardization to 
provide support for the dependent variable is no longer necessary. The abnormal accrual 
measurement employs time and industry specific parameters, controlling for related 
effects. 
The regressions use the full sample including the periods in which transactions of 
multiple types are reported. In light of the non-linearity of the relation between abnormal 
accruals and transaction size, I employ a specification using transaction indicator 
variables. The indicator variables are turned on for observations whose standardized, 
scaled trade sizes fall in the upper one-third of the size distribution for each transaction 
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type.  In addition, since the hypotheses predict that the earnings management motivated 
by option grants and stock purchases is the reverse of the earnings management related to 
stock sales, I include interaction terms between each of the sales variables and an 
indicator variable set equal to one in periods when either a grant or purchase is reported. 























where EMit+1 = represents abnormal accruals for the quarter preceding the grant, 
purchase or sale transaction 
Grantit = 1 if an option grant is reported by the executive of firm i in quarter t 
Purchaseit = 1 if a stock purchase is reported by the executive of firm i in quarter t 
Saleit-0…6 = 1 if a stock sale is reported by the executive of firm i in quarter t
Buyit = 1 if either an option grant or stock purchase is reported by the executive   
of firm i in quarter t
Because the abnormal accruals variable is not standardized the coefficients on the 
transaction variables represent the amount of abnormal accruals, expressed as a fraction 
of total assets, associated with the respective equity transaction. According to hypotheses 
two and three, I expect the coefficients on Grant and Purchase to be negative and the 
coefficients on the seven Sale variables to be positive. The signs on the interaction terms 
could be positive or negative depending on whether sale or purchase earnings 
management incentives dominate, so I make no predictions regarding them. 
The first column under the heading Equation (9) in Table 10 reports the results of 
the regression for CEOs. The intercept term equals the mean abnormal accruals for the 
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control group. The coefficients on the test variables represent the amount by which 
abnormal accruals differ from the control level. Consistent with the univariate results and 
prediction, the coefficient on Purchase is significantly negative. The coefficient value of 
-0.0070 indicates abnormal accruals for CEOs making large stock purchases are lower 
than the mean control abnormal accruals of 0.07% of assets by 0.70% of assets. Thus, 
negative abnormal accruals for the purchasing executives average 0.63% of assets (0.07% 
minus 0.70%), confirming that the sample CEOs appear to take income-decreasing 
actions prior to large stock purchases. 
I again find no evidence of accrual management prior to large option grants to 
CEOs.  However, in contrast to the univariate results, the coefficient on sale is 
significantly negative after controlling for profitability, growth, leverage and risk 
suggesting that reported earnings are managed down in anticipation of large insider sales. 
One possible explanation is that executives both reserve income and sell shares in high 
profit periods in anticipation of weak future performance. Alternatively, the executive 
may use negative abnormal accruals to communicate private information about future 
performance. The positive abnormal accrual effect in the first period subsequent to the 
sale is of nearly equal magnitude to the negative effect observed in the sale period, 
consistent with reversal of reserves established in the period of sale to avoid a post-sale 
earnings decline. Abnormal accruals follow an increasing trend over each of the next five 
quarters but are statistically significant only from the fourth quarter on. This pattern is 
consistent with that illustrated in Figure 3, again suggesting possible accrual management 
to distance unfavorable news from insider sales accompanied by a build-up of accruals as 
time passes.
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The regression results for CFOs appear in the second column of Table 10. The 
findings differ from the univariate results in several respects. First, the coefficient on 
grants is significantly negative implying average negative abnormal accruals equal to 
0.34% (i.e. the coefficient of -0.0046 less the intercept 0.0012) of assets in quarters when 
CFOs receive large grants of stock options. Second, CFO stock purchases are no longer 
associated with positive abnormal accruals. Finally, abnormal accrual usage is not 
significant for any post-sale period.
Although the magnitudes of the regressions coefficients are small, the inferred 
accruals could have a pivotal effect on achieving earnings targets. Consider the 0.0038 
value for the coefficient for the first quarter following a CEO sale. For a $1 billion asset 
firm with 65 million shares outstanding (the mean number of shares outstanding for 
sample firms with $1 to $1.5 billion in assets) this translates into $3.1 million [(0.0038-
0.0007)*1 billion] in above average accruals which could impact earnings by as much as 
4.8 cents per share. 
In order to assess whether strong governance inhibits transaction driven accrual 
manipulations, I expand equation (9) to include Governance Score and interaction terms 
between Governance Score (represented by G in the interaction terms) and the various 








































      As in the sensitivity regressions, I find that governance quality is negatively 
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related to abnormal accruals but does not appear to significantly influence the use of 
abnormal accruals surrounding insider trades.
In total my findings indicate that CEOs sell shares in expectation of poor earnings 
performance and use income-increasing earnings management to distance their 
transactions from the disappointing news; CEOs use income-decreasing earnings 
management preceding large equity purchases; income-decreasing accruals precede CFO 
option grants; and corporate governance does not influence the use of transaction-related 
accrual manipulations.
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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions
This paper investigates whether executive wealth sensitivity to stock price 
fluctuations or executive equity transactions serve as incentives for earnings 
management. I find that increasing wealth sensitivity, most notably the sensitivity arising 
from stock holdings, is associated with CEO abnormal accrual usage. Further, the relation 
between abnormal accruals and stock-based wealth sensitivity is consistent with income-
smoothing earnings management. Since smooth earnings are associated with higher stock 
valuations (Thomas and Zhang 2002; Allayannis and Weston 2003) my findings suggest 
that wealth exposure arising from stock ownership is effective in aligning the interests of 
CEOs and shareholders. 
I also analyze whether governance quality influences the wealth sensitivity-
abnormal accrual relation. While strong governance is associated with lower overall 
levels of abnormal accruals, governance does not significantly influence the association 
between CEO stock-based wealth sensitivity and earnings smoothing. The failure of 
governance to curb earnings management supports the proposition that income smoothing 
is an expected outcome of efficient contracting consistent with incentive alignment. 
These results complement Heflin, Kwon and Wild (2002) who also find earnings 
smoothing is associated with strong governance. They reason that stewardship over 
corporate assets involves maximizing returns for shareholders which managers 
accomplish in part through accrual adjustments. 
I also examine whether executives manage earnings in order to maximize the 
value of their stock transactions. In the absence of insider stock transactions all 
shareholders share the costs and benefits of earnings management. However, if 
executives opportunistically trade based on proprietary knowledge about the distribution 
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of unmanaged earnings, there is a potential redistribution of wealth from outside 
shareholders to executives. My findings suggest managers behave opportunistically. 
Specifically, I find an increase in income-decreasing accruals preceding large stock 
purchases by CEOs as well as an increase in income-increasing accruals following, but 
not preceding, large stock sales by CEOs; both suggest trading on private information. 
These results extend those of Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2003, KHP) and Beneish, Press 
and Vargus (2004). KHP find that insider sales precede breaks in earnings strings by up 
to nine quarters consistent with trading based on foreknowledge of disappointing 
earnings news. My results indicate the revelation of the bad news may be deliberately 
distanced from the sale through accrual manipulations.  My results also agree with BPV’s 
findings for a sample of firms that subsequently experience a technical default, that 
insiders use income-increasing earnings management following sales but not preceding 
sales; they further indicate the BPV results extend to a more general population of firms.
I also document that governance does not materially alter CEO use of abnormal 
accruals around transactions despite the manifest evidence of opportunism. My ability to 
document trade related earnings management, but not a governance effect on the relation, 
suggests that opportunistic trade is an expected outcome of contracting that, despite 
wealth transfers to the executive, may be beneficial to shareholders. My results are 
consistent with Roulstone’s (2000) findings that firms that restrict insider trading pay a 
significant premium in total compensation and with Dye’s (1984) model that 
demonstrates that, under certain circumstances, both managers and owners achieve higher 
utility when managers are allowed to trade on inside information. 
This study has several important limitations. First, I assume that the accruals 
models provide accurate measures of abnormal accruals. While variations on the Jones 
model have been used extensively to estimate discretionary accruals, several recent 
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studies question the reliability of the model (Kang and Sivaramakrishnan 1995; Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley 2002). While my results are robust to three different abnormal 
accruals models, all rely on similar assumptions to partition accruals into 
nondiscretionary and discretionary components so that measurement error may span all 
the models. Second, my option-based wealth sensitivity measures are based on Black 
Scholes option pricing. A number of the assumptions underlying Black Scholes do not 
hold for executive options, most importantly the assumption of risk neutrality. Finally, 
governance is a complex system of interrelated factors. Factors that influence the 
examined relations may not be effectively captured by my governance measures. 
Nonetheless, this study provides useful evidence about the effectiveness of stock-
based wealth compensation in efficient contracting and raises some interesting questions 
for future research. In particular, my results show that significant stock ownership leads
to earnings management consistent with long-term incentive alignment; however, I 
observe wide cross-sectional variation in stock-based wealth sensitivity suggesting 
compensation is not uniformly designed to motivate CEOs to maximize long-term value. 
I also document evidence of opportunistic behavior around equity transactions. 
Furthermore, although opportunistic earnings management does not appear to be in 
shareholders’ best interests, governance controls do not serve as deterrents. 
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Figure 1
Relation Between Total Wealth Sensitivity and Abnormal Accruals
This figure depicts the relation between total sensitivity of executive wealth to stock price change and 
abnormal accrual magnitudes. The scale for total sensitivity is the within sample rank with 1 (15) 
representing the lowest (highest) sensitivity group. Abnormal accruals are standardized by BBL SIC to a 
mean of zero. Positive (negative) abnormal accruals with values greater (less) than zero have magnitudes 
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Figure 2
Mean Abnormal Accruals Preceding Option Grants and Stock Purchases
This figure shows the mean abnormal accruals for the quarter-end preceding stock option grants and stock 
purchases for sample CEOs and CFOs receiving grants or making purchases. Grant size is calculated as the 
proportion of shares underlying the grant to the sum of shares and options owned prior to the grant, 
standardized for each executive type by industry. Purchase size is equal to the shares purchased scaled by 
the shares owned prior to the purchase. Transaction sizes are standardized by industry and executive type. 
Small, medium and large grants (purchases) are those that fall within the lowest, middle and highest thirds 
of the sample distribution, respectively, for each executive type. Controls are the mean abnormal accruals 
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Mean Abnormal Accruals by Transaction Size 
Proximal to CEO and CFO Stock Sales
This figure portrays the mean abnormal accruals for the quarter-end preceding stock sales (0), and each of 
the six quarter-ends following a stock sale (+1 through +6). Size of sale is measured as the proportion of 
shares sold to shares owned prior to the sale, standardized for each executive type by industry. Small, 
medium and large sales are those that fall within the lowest, middle and highest thirds of the sample 
distribution, respectively, for each executive type. Controls are the mean abnormal accruals for quarters 
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Principal Components of Governance Score
Governance score is constructed as the linear combination of the products of the factor loadings and the 
variable values for each observation using the factor loadings for the first principal component obtained 
using principal component analysis of the five governance variables. Directors is the number of directors 
on the firms’ board. Outside represents the fraction of the board members that are not current or former 
employees, their relatives, or consultants or attorneys employed by the firm. Meetings is the number of 
meetings held during the year. Institution equals the percentage of shares of the firm held by institutional 
investors. G score is a measure of shareholder rights constructed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). 
Pair-wise correlations among the five variables, the factor loadings, and the variance explained by the first 
principal component are summarized. The principal component analysis is carried out separately for each 
BBL SIC code to provide an industry-specific composite measure of governance.
         Pearson Correlations Factor Variance
SIC Code Directors Outside Meetings Institution G score Loading Explained
Directors 1 0.23 0.48** 0.32 0.41** 0.70
Outside 1 0.11 -0.28 -0.15 0.07
1 Meetings 1 -0.24 0.05 0.41 35%
Institution 1 0.22 0.30
G score 1 0.50
Directors 1 0.43*** 0.14 0.28* -0.02 0.52
Outside 1 0.10 0.10 -0.20 0.43
2 Meetings 1 0.51*** -0.03 0.49 36%
Institution 1 0.05 0.54
G score 1 -0.11
Directors 1 0.03 -0.009 -0.23*** 0.18** 0.02
Outside 1 0.46*** 0.24*** 0.38*** 0.60
3 Meetings 1 0.20** 0.27*** 0.55 37%
Institution 1 0.06 0.32
G score 1 0.47
Directors 1 -0.10 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.26
Outside 1 0.06 0.19* 0.11 0.41
4 Meetings 1 0.00 0.08 0.23 28%
Institution 1 0.24** 0.61
G score 1 0.58
Directors 1 0.18 0.54*** 0.11 0.42*** 0.57
Outside 1 0.26* -0.21 0.10 0.26
5 Meetings 1 0.26* 0.39*** 0.59 41%
Institution 1 -0.01 0.15
G score 1 0.48
Directors 1 -0.08 0.21 0.27** -0.13 0.59
Outside 1 0.23* -0.07 -0.12 0.15
6 Meetings 1 -0.07 -0.10 0.38 30%
Institution 1 -0.19 0.49
G score 1 -0.50
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Table 1, continued
         Pearson Correlations Factor Variance
SIC Code Directors Outside Meetings Institution G score Loading Explained
Directors 1 0.35*** 0.14** 0.16*** 0.32*** 0.53
Outside 1 0.14** 0.08 0.35*** 0.53
7 Meetings 1 0.09 0.10* 0.28 36%
Institution 1 0.15*** 0.29
G score 1 0.52
Directors 1 0.15* 0.11 0.01 0.33*** 0.72
Outside 1 0.07 0.18** -0.07 0.31
8 Meetings 1 0.09 -0.07 0.18 27%
Institution 1 -0.01 0.17
G score 1 0.57
Directors 1 0.31** 0.55*** 0.01 0.14 0.44
Outside 1 0.28** 0.18 0.62*** 0.53
9 Meetings 1 0.02 0.35*** 0.50 43%
Institution 1 0.07 0.13
G score 1 0.50
Directors 1 0.28*** 0.21*** -0.03 0.07 0.39
Outside 1 0.16** 0.11 0.15** 0.47
10 Meetings 1 0.18** 0.18** 0.49 33%
Institution 1 0.29*** 0.41
G score 1 0.47
Directors 1 0.88*** 0.04 0.52*** -0.1 0.54
Outside 1 0.16 0.63*** -0.07 0.38
11 Meetings 1 0.35** -0.09 -0.07 50%
Institution 1 -0.35** -0.39
G score 1 0.63




This table presents summary statistics for the sample firms, the CEOs and the CFOs. Panel A provides the 
distribution of the 410 sample firms by industry. Panel B shows the firm financial and governance 
characteristics over the 1996-1999 time period. Panel C summarizes the compensation and wealth variables 
for the sample CEOs and CFOs. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Panel A                                                          Distribution of Sample Firms by Industry
     Industry
      Code[1]
Industry 
Description SIC Codes Included
Sample
Firms Percent
1 Mining and construction 1000-1299, 1400-1999 10 2.40%
3.70%
3 Textiles, printing and publishing 2200-2799 54 13.20%
2 Food 2000-2111 15
6.10%
5 Pharmaceuticals 2830-2836 25 6.10%
4 Chemicals 2800-2824, 2840-2899 25
4.90%
7 Durable manufacturers 3000-3569, 3580-3669, 3680-3999 115 28.00%
6 Extractive industries 2900-2999, 1300-1399 20
11.70%
9 Transportation 4000-4899 21 5.10%
8 Computers 7370-7379, 3570-3579, 3670-3679 48
15.90%
11 Services 7000-7369, 7380-8999 12 2.90%



















[1] Industry classifications are based on Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1998)
[2] Expressed as a percent of total assets
(dollar amounts in millions) Mean Median Quartile
Panel B                                                            Firm Characteristics
Upper
N=1,661 firm years except as noted
Financial Variables
Total assets $5,231.99 $1,492.20 $4,813.96 
Sales $5,703.58 $1,732.17 $4,969.40 
Market value of equity $10,605.68 $1,926.61 $5,952.34 
Market to book 4.33 2.68 4.54
Return on assets 6.50% 7.20% 10.90%
Debt to assets 0.55 0.55 0.67
Abnormal accruals 0.12% -0.08% 2.66%
Positive abnormal accruals[2] (N=851) 4.32% 2.73% 6.02%
Negative abnormal accruals[2] (N=810) -3.88% -2.52% -1.24%
Governance Variables
Outside directors  as a percent of total 75% 78% 85%
Number of directors 9.68 9 11
Number of meetings 7.25 7 9
Shares  held by institutions 62% 62% 73%




(000s omitted except for age) Mean Deviation Quartile Median Quartile
       CEOs
Age 54.59 6.16 51 55 59
Salary $605.39 $311.34 $391.58 $545.92 $750.00 
Bonus* $609.36 $841.88 $162.64 $400.25 $763.18 
Stock (shares) 3,384.55 39,443.04 79.06 260.06 1,078.28
Restricted stock (shares) 60.67 561.75 0 0 21.07
Options (shares) 1,277.25 2,437.89 204.23 489.58 1,219.50
Grants (shares) 247.21 662.18 20 73.05 200
Exercises (shares) 122.41 475 0 0 57.64
Wealth sensitivity*
     Total** $766.61 $2,098.61 $81.01 $206.44 $630.30 
     Stock-based $469.18 $1,877.78 $17.47 $61.26 $199.78 
     Option-based $283.26 $665.83 $27.34 $90.39 $252.84 
N=1249 executive years for 330 CFOs        CFOs
Salary $272.53 $120.38 $188.33 $248.75 $343.75 
Bonus* $185.69 $195.08 $49.72 $131.24 $264.82 
Stock (shares) 57.76 124.32 7.37 22.46 61.20
Restricted stock (shares) 6.76 22.81 0 0 2.5
Options (shares) 195.41 273.38 60 114 230.999
Grants (shares) 67.19 140.92 10 25 60.074
Exercises (shares) 24.24 61.51 0 0 20.5
Wealth sensitivity*
     Total** $117.86 $290.81 $17.88 $40.94 $102.61 
     Stock-based $23.22 $41.98 $2.09 $8.59 $24.28 
     Option-based $94.64 $280.70 $9.34 $26.10 $65.22 
    *Values are not scaled by salary and bonus
    **Total sensitivity includes stock-based, option-based and restricted stock-based wealth sensitivities 
Panel C                                                Characteristics of Sample Executives




    This table presents correlation matrices for the pooled sample. Pearson correlations for the CEO (CFO) sample are presented above (below) the diagonal, p 
values appear in italics below the correlations. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Absolute abnormal accruals 1 0.0878 -0.1672 -0.1076 -0.1423 0.1233 0.0942 -0.0792 0.0968
0.0103 0.0068 0.0023 <0.0001 0.0416 0.0069 0.0236 0.0023
(2) Total sensitivity -0.0687 1 -0.0754 -0.0020 0.1991 0.2269 0.1395 -0.1809 -0.0078
0.1231 0.0653 0.6051 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.7475
(3) Governance -0.0771 0.0499 1 0.2181 0.3878 -0.1298 -0.0083 0.3296 -0.0619
0.0762 0.1237 0.0092 0.0004 0.0001 0.8830 0.0062 0.0109
(4) Bonus -0.8650 0.0181 0.0478 1 0.4311 0.0737 0.1354 0.1942 -0.0772
0.0400 0.5772 0.1400 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0001 0.0183 0.0015
(5) Size -0.1702 0.3856 0.2249 0.3418 1 0.2927 0.3656 0.0703 -0.2060
0.0001 <0.0001 0.0488 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0045 <0.0001
(6) Return on assets 0.0377 0.1779 -0.0180 0.2365 0.3421 1 0.2522 -0.4644 -0.0298
0.1829 <0.0001 0.5795 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.2213
(7) Market to book 0.0655 0.1676 -0.0142 0.1290 0.3556 0.3085 1 -0.0267 0.0001
0.1226 <0.0001 0.6615 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0506 0.9978
(8) Debt to assets -0.0107 0.0131 0.0365 0.0199 -0.0334 -0.4846 -0.0643 1 -0.1166
0.8270 0.6859 0.2601 0.5395 0.3032 <0.0001 0.0472 <0.0001
(9) Stock volatility 0.0865 0.0246 -0.0173 -0.0468 -0.2083 -0.0115 0.0126 -0.1017 1
0.0480 0.4483 0.5939 0.1487 <0.0001 0.7237 0.6974 0.0017
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Table 4
 Regressions of Absolute Abnormal Accruals on Wealth Sensitivity
This table presents the coefficients from regressions of absolute abnormal accruals (|EM|) on wealth 
sensitivity measures and control variables. T statistics appear in italics below the coefficient estimates. 
Each panel presents regression results for a different model. The models appear at the bottom of the second 
and third pages of this table. Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Panel A Regress ion Results  - Equation (4)
    Predicted Sign CEOs CFOs






Bonus + 0.0922* -0.0260
1.65 -0.79
Size - -0.1946*** -0.1154***
-6.65 -2.90
Return on assets ? 0.1099*** 0.0720**
3.59 1.86
Market to book ? 0.0949*** 0.0751**
3.73 2.24
Debt to assets + 0.0692** 0.0376
2.45 1.06
Stock volatility + 0.0582** 0.0758**
2.42 2.40
Adjusted R square 0.0682 0.0382
Panel B Regress ion Results  - Equation (5)
    Predicted Sign CEOs CFOs
Total Sensitivity + 0.2182** -0.0221
3.35 -0.34






Governance - -0.0389** -0.0473**
-1.79 -1.76
Bonus + 0.0863* -0.0237
1.52 -0.72
Size - -0.1746*** -0.1862***
-5.70 -2.88
Return on assets ? 0.0927*** 0.0664**
3.36 1.70
Market to book ? 0.0897*** 0.0826**
3.56 2.16
Debt to assets + 0.0828*** 0.0471*
2.89 1.31
Stock volatility + 0.0545** 0.0691**
2.25 2.17
Adjusted R square 0.0732 0.0445
*,**,*** denote significance at p=0.10, 0.05, 0.01, respectively  under a one tailed t test 
N=1661 for CEOs; N=1249 for CFOs
84





































Panel C            Regression Results - Equation (6)
    Predicted Sign CEOs CFOs
Stock Sensitivity + 0.2378*** -0.0529
3.76 -1.05






Option Sensitivity + -0.0002 -0.0002
-0.01 -0.15






Governance - -0.0353** -0.0499*
-1.61 -1.40
Bonus + -0.0394* -0.0252
-1.47 -0.77
Size - -0.1725*** -0.1594**
-5.45 -2.62
Return on assets ? 0.0968*** 0.0661**
3.32 1.69
Market to book ? 0.1026*** 0.0749**
3.82 2.24
Debt to assets + 0.0826*** 0.0506*
2.88 1.40
Stock Volatility + 0.0530** 0.0662**
2.38 2.07
Adjusted R square 0.0831 0.0462
*,**,*** denote significance at p=0.10, 0.05, 0.01, respectively under a one tailed t test 
N=1661 for CEOs; N=1249 for CFOs
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Panel D            Regression Results - Equation (7)
    Predicted Sign CEOs CFOs
Stock Sensitivity + 0.2325*** -0.0503
3.63 -0.98






Vested Sensitivity + -0.0620 -0.1256
-0.92 -1.20






Unvested Sensitivity + 0.0415 0.0541
0.83 1.22






Governance - -0.0344** -0.0726**
-1.73 -1.98
Bonus + -0.0380* -0.034
-1.42 -0.88
Size - -0.1759*** 0.1683***
-5.55 3.02
Return on assets ? 0.0927*** 0.0933**
3.16 1.88
Market to book ? 0.0954*** 0.0804**
4.04 1.96
Debt to assets + 0.0830*** 0.0480
2.90 0.82
Stock Volatility + 0.0513** 0.0672**
2.11 2.32
Adjusted R square 0.0825 0.0533
*,**,*** denote significance at p=0.10, 0.05, 0.01, respectively under a one tailed t test 
N=1661 for CEOs; N=1249 for CFOs
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Table 5
 Regressions of Signed Abnormal Accruals on Wealth Sensitivity
This table presents the coefficients from regressions of positive (EM+) and negative (EM-) abnormal 
accruals on wealth sensitivity measures and control variables. T statistics appear in italics below the 
coefficient estimates. Each panel presents regression results for a different model. The models appear at 
the bottom of the second and third pages of this table. Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Panel A Regression Results - Equation (4)
    Predicted Sign                     CEOs                     CFOs
Dependent Variavle: EM+ EM- EM+ EM- EM+ EM-
Total Sensitivity + - 0.1697*** -0.2037*** 0.0314 0.0925
2.33 -2.59 0.34 0.99
TS
2
- + -0.0135** 0.0095 -0.0103 -0.0227*
-1.94 1.02 -0.62 -1.42
Bonus + - 0.0167 0.1173*** 0.0501 0.0746*
0.44 3.14 0.98 1.54
Size - + -0.2599*** 0.1500*** -0.1795*** 0.1335***
-6.05 3.73 -2.73 2.45
Return on assets ? ? 0.1899*** -0.0830** 0.1256** -0.0134
4.12 -2.13 1.84 -0.26
Market to book ? ? 0.1109*** -0.0889** 0.0759** -0.1183**
3.28 -2.32 1.69 -2.03
Debt to assets + ? 0.0592* -0.0813** 0.0595 -0.0111
1.34 -2.07 0.98 -0.23
Stock volatility + - 0.0478* -0.0718** 0.0505 -0.0671*
1.37 -2.09 1.10 -1.38
Adjusted R square 0.0751 0.0613 0.0321 0.0450
Panel B Regression Results - Equation (5)
    Predicted Sign                     CEOs                     CFOs
Dependent Variavle: EM+ EM- EM+ EM- EM+ EM-
Total Sensitivity + - 0.1626** -0.1979*** 0.0319 0.0984
2.23 -2.51 0.34 1.03
TS*G - + -0.0301 -0.0907 0.0019 -0.0081
-0.58 -0.87 0.09 -0.14
TS
2
- + -0.0128** 0.0089 -0.0106 -0.0242*
-1.85 0.96 -0.60 -1.51
Governance - + -0.0469** -0.0084 -0.0080 0.0612*
-1.98 -0.26 -0.26 1.60
Bonus + - 0.0186 0.1191*** 0.0508 0.0719*
0.49 3.18 0.99 1.48
Size - + -0.2586*** 0.1494*** -0.1789*** 0.1327***
-6.02 3.70 -2.71 2.42
Return on assets ? ? 0.1865*** -0.0815** 0.1267** -0.0042
4.04 -2.08 1.84 -0.08
Market to book ? ? 0.1107*** -0.0890** 0.0756** -0.1207**
3.28 -2.32 1.68 -2.07
Debt to assets + ? 0.0578* -0.0816** 0.0611 -0.0073
1.30 -2.07 1.00 -0.15
Stock volatility + - 0.0428 -0.0705** 0.0513 -0.0681*
1.23 -2.05 1.11 -1.38
Adjusted R square 0.0796 0.0622 0.0323 0.0511
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Panel C            Regression Results - Equation (6)
Predicted Sign                     CEOs                     CFOs
   Dependent Variable
EM+ EM- EM+ EM- EM+ EM-
Stock Sensitivity + - 0.2019*** -0.2564*** -0.0453 0.0029
2.73 -3.10 -0.49 0.03
SS*G - + -0.0303 -0.0499 -0.0377* 0.0007
-0.65 -0.65 -1.56 0.21
SS
2
- + 0.0202*** 0.0157* 0.0320* 0.0094
-2.67 1.62 1.34 0.38
Option Sensitivity + - 0.0364 0.0712 -0.0372 -0.0367
0.66 0.89 -0.38 -0.39
OS*G - + -0.0337 -0.0239 0.0262 -0.0001
-1.02 -0.80 0.75 0.00
OS
2
- + 0.0058 -0.0053 -0.0019 -0.0045
0.94 -0.19 -0.11 -0.31
Governance - + -0.0454** 0.0053 0.0001 0.0602*
-1.91 0.17 0.00 1.49
Bonus + - 0.0342 0.1239*** 0.0411 0.0732*
0.89 3.31 0.79 1.50
Size - + -0.2700*** 0.1166*** -0.1632*** 0.1562***
-5.95 2.70 -2.45 2.86
Return on assets ? ? 0.1780*** -0.0791** 0.1322** -0.0056
3.86 -2.01 1.92 -0.11
Market to book ? ? 0.1087*** -0.0953*** 0.0810** -0.1126**
3.21 -2.49 1.80 2.06
Debt to assets + ? 0.0613* -0.0901** 0.0733 -0.0009
1.39 -2.27 1.19 -0.02
Stock Volatility + - 0.0397 -0.0784** 0.0556 -0.0569
1.14 -2.27 1.20 -1.14
Adjusted R square 0.0878 0.0681 0.0418 0.0504
*,**,*** denote significance at p=0.10, 0.05, 0.01, respectively under a one tailed t test 















































Panel D            Regression Results - Equation (7)
Predicted Sign                     CEOs                     CFOs
   Dependent Variable
EM+ EM- EM+ EM- EM+ EM-
Stock Sensitivity + - 0.2204*** -0.2536*** -0.0500 0.0005
2.91 -3.05 -0.54 0.01
SS*G - + -0.0292 -0.0510 -0.0176 0.0003
-0.63 -0.66 -0.67 0.12
SS
2
- + -0.0244*** 0.0155* 0.0327* 0.0097
-2.95 1.59 1.38 0.38
Vested Sensitivity + - -0.0519 0.0699 -0.1019 0.0282
-0.76 0.85 -1.16 0.28
VS*G - + 0.0205 -0.0228 -0.0610 -0.0226
0.48 -0.53 -1.07 -0.31
VS
2
- + 0.0195** -0.0077 0.0035 -0.0087
1.70 -0.32 0.29 -0.37
Unvested Sensitivity + - 0.1192** 0.0456 0.1073 -0.0594
1.78 0.55 1.12 -0.64
US*G - + -0.0373** -0.0033 0.1132** 0.0325
-1.68 -0.10 2.07 0.37
US
2
- + -0.0163* -0.0092 -0.0131 -0.0011
-1.38 -0.39 -0.72 -0.07
Governance - + -0.0438** 0.0056 -0.0172 0.0586*
-1.83 0.18 -0.46 1.47
Bonus + - 0.0318 0.1221*** 0.0369 0.0714*
0.83 3.24 0.71 1.46
Size - + -0.2741*** 0.1124*** -0.1747*** 0.1586***
-6.01 2.59 -2.60 2.85
Return on assets ? ? 0.1699*** -0.0780** 0.1147** -0.0002
3.67 -1.95 1.66 0.00
Market to book ? ? 0.1079*** -0.0934** 0.0823** -0.1138**
3.19 -2.42 1.83 -1.93
Debt to assets + ? 0.0634* -0.0916** 0.0605 -0.0018
1.43 -2.30 0.98 -0.04
Stock Volatility + - 0.0349 -0.0774** 0.0480 -0.0526
1.00 -2.24 1.04 -1.05
Adjusted R square 0.0931 0.0687 0.0538 0.0531
*,**,*** denote significance at p=0.10, 0.05, 0.01, respectively under a one tailed t test 
N=851 for EM +, 810 for EM - for CEOs;     N=607 for EM +, 642 for EM- for CFOs
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Table 6
Tests of Income Smoothing 
This table presents the results of the tests of income smoothing. All variables are standardized by industry 
prior to selecting the observations with the largest abnormal accrual magnitudes. The tests of smoothing 
presented in this table are conducted on the one-third of the sample with the greatest industry-standardized 
abnormal accrual magnitudes. Panel A shows the mean positive and negative abnormal accruals, and 
earnings surprise by wealth sensitivity rank. Earnings surprise is the standardized absolute value of the 
difference between reported and expected earnings where earnings expectations are based on a random 
walk with drift. Panel B provides the coefficients for regressions of earnings surprise on sensitivity. Panel 
C provides the mean coefficients of variation for firm-specific 5 year time series regressions of net income 
on time for firms whose CEOs wealth sensitivity falls in the upper (high sensitivity), middle (moderate 
sensitivity) and lower (low sensitivity) one-third of the sample distribution. The coefficient of variation is 
calculated for each firm as the root mean square error for the time series regression, divided by the mean 
earnings surprise times one hundred. 
*,**,*** denote significance at p=0.10, 0.05, 0.01 respectively under
                    a one-tailed t test




                  Total Wealth Sensitivity 
Rank 1 (Low) 0.09 -1.13 0.35
Rank 2 (Mid) 1.06 -1.05 0.19
Rank 3 (High) 1.32 -1.20 -0.11
Rank 3 - Rank 1 1.23** -0.07 -0.46***
              Stock-based Wealth Sensitivity
Rank 1 (Low) 0.62 -1.06 0.36
Rank 2 (Mid) 1.01 -1.05 0.14
Rank 3 (High) 1.40 -1.29 -0.06
Rank 3 - Rank 1 0.78** -0.23* -0.42***
              Option-based Wealth Sensitivity
Rank 1 (Low) 1.10 -1.35 0.20
Rank 2 (Mid) 1.07 -1.19 0.21
Rank 3 (High) 0.99 -0.85 -0.07
Rank 3 - Rank 1 -0.11 0.50** -0.27
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Table 6, continued




Total Wealth Sensitivity -0.006** -2.03
Stock-based Wealth Sensitivity -0.006** -2.01
Option-based Wealth Sensitivity -0.004 -0.72
itεitySensitivit1α0αit SurpriseEarnings ++=
Panel C            Coefficients of Variation for Regressions of Income on Time
Low Moderate High High
Sensitivity Sensitivity Sensitivity minus Low
Total Wealth Sensitivity 6.03 2.73 1.65 -4.38
Stock-based Wealth Sensitivity 6.68 2.39 1.36 -5.32*
Option-based Wealth Sensitivity 1.16 7.38 1.77 0.61
*,**,*** denote significance at p=0.10, 0.05, 0.01, respectively under a one-tailed t test
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Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for Insider Transactions
This table provides descriptive statistics for the transaction activities for the sample CEOs and CFOs. Panel 
A summarizes the distribution of transaction sizes conditioned on the related transaction being reported (i.e. 
zero values are not included). Scaled shares underlying option grants is the proportion of shares underlying 
the grant to the sum of shares and options owned prior to the grant. The scaled shares sold, scaled net 
proceeds, and scaled shares sold are ratios of the shares transacted to the shares owned prior to the 
transaction. Panel B provides the frequency statistics for CEOs and CFOs by transaction type.
Panel A                                                       Transaction Characteristics                
Standard Lower Upper 
Mean Deviation Quartile Median Quartile
CEOs
Shares underlying option grants 118,833 145,965 17,911 60,000 152,000
Scaled shares underlying option grants 0.55 3.15 0.04 0.16 0.37
Shares purchased 31,629 65,210 580 4,943 22,590
Scaled shares purchased 0.05 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00
Shares sold 54,107 83,984 2,996 15,100 62,000
Scaled shares sold 0.19 0.27 0.01 0.07 0.24
Net proceeds from sales (thousands) $1,493 $2,008 $161 $585 $1,906
Scaled net proceeds from sales 1,644.92 6,060.91 0.03 0.13 0.50
CFOs
Shares underlying option grants 37,180 42,475 7,500 20,000 50,000
Scaled shares underlying option grants 0.40 1.31 0.07 0.22 0.42
Shares purchased 5,819 10,933 265 1,029 5,000
Scaled shares purchased 0.16 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
Shares sold 17,512 23,428 2,177 8,000 21,500
Scaled shares sold 0.44 0.39 0.07 0.30 0.92
Net proceeds from sales (thousands) $1,229 $1,499 $203 $729 $1,735
Scaled net proceeds from sales 1,674.88 5,358.85 0.07 0.33 4.79
Panel B                                                        Frequency of Transactions
         Number of Transactions in Executive-Quarters
CEOs CFOs
                               Option grants 1887 1203
                               Stock purchases 495 341
                               Stock sales 1869 910
                               No transactions* 3095 2583
                               Total executive quarters 6250 4324
              Number of Individuals with Transactions
CEOs CFOs
                               Option grants 376 256
                               Stock purchases 168 110
                               Stock sales 361 254
                               No transactions** 22 33
                               Total executives 380 264
*Includes quarters 1 through 6 following a stock sale where no other transactions are reported
**Number of individuals reporting no transactions over the entire study period
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Table 8
Abnormal Accruals by Transaction Type
This table provides a summary of the distribution of abnormal accruals by transaction type. The transactions included represent those for which no other 
transactions are reported in the quarter of the transaction, and for which no stock sales have occurred within the prior six quarters. The control mean is 
the mean value of abnormal accruals for the executive-quarters where no transactions are reported.
 Abnormal Accruals
Number o f Number o f Trans action 
Execu tive- Firms  Re- Percen t Standard Lower Upper M ean  M inus
Quarters pres en ted Pos itive M ean Deviation Quartile M edian Quartile Control M ean
CEOs  4085 329
No trans actions 2171 292 53.2% 0.0016* 0.0536 -0.0255 0.0021 0.0256
Option  gran ts 515 188 51.8% -0.0001 0.0485 -0.0223 0.0021 0.0261 -0.0016
Stock purchas es 174 96 47.1%
+
-0.0054* 0.0490 -0.0340 -0.0019 0.0251 -0.0070**
Stock s ales 301 231 52.5% 0.002 0.0496 -0.0216 0.0030 0.0307 0.0005
       Sales  quarter +1 248 183 55.6% 0.0102*** 0.0513 -0.0191 0.0064 0.0401 0.0086***
       Sales  quarter +2 164 117 56.1% 0.0072** 0.0532 -0.0214 0.0058 0.0370 0.0056*
       Sales  quarter +3 168 117 59.5%
++
0.0085*** 0.0469 -0.0159 0.0075 0.0304 0.0069**
       Sales  quarter +4 129 105 57.4% 0.0050 0.0520 -0.0151 0.0056 0.0315 0.0034
       Sales  quarter +5 115 105 54.8% 0.0056* 0.0450 -0.0146 0.0045 0.0253 0.0040
       Sales  quarter +6 100 87 50.0% 0.0027 0.0523 -0.0176 0.0004 0.0256 0.0012
CFOs 3399 243
No trans actions 2001 230 53.1% 0.0013 0.0540 -0.0264 0.0030 0.0305
Option  gran ts 468 195 48.5%
++
-0.0020 0.0506 -0.0287 -0.0007 0.0271 -0.0033
Stock purchas es 139 77 61.9%
++
0.0091*** 0.0480 -0.0184 0.0010 0.0337 0.0079**
Stock s ales 209 169 47.8%
+
0.0029 0.0498 -0.0242 -0.0024 0.0322 0.0016
       Sales  quarter +1 170 130 43.5%
+++
0.0006 0.0509 -0.0270 -0.0045 0.0263 -0.0006
       Sales  quarter +2 117 96 58.1% 0.0099** 0.0494 -0.0196 0.0097 0.0309 0.0086**
       Sales  quarter +3 102 78 58.8% 0.0105*** 0.0453 -0.0179 0.0066 0.0294 0.0093**
       Sales  quarter +4 64 58 56.3% 0.0102** 0.0379 -0.0074 0.0105 0.0311 0.0089**
       Sales  quarter +5 72 67 62.5%
+
0.0069* 0.0409 -0.0079 0.0106 0.0260 0.0057
       Sales  quarter +6 57 53 59.6%
+
0.0104** 0.0359 -0.0080 0.0047 0.0265 0.0091*
*,**,*** denote significance at  p =0.10, 0.05, 0.01 resp ect ively  under a one-tailed t  test
+ ,+ + ,+ + +  denote significance at  p =0.10, 0.05, 0.01, resp ect ively  under a binomial p robability  dist ribut ion w ith p robability  of a p osit ive value equal to 0.532
            for CEO s, and 0.531 for CFO s
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 Table 9
Mean Abnormal Accruals by Transaction Size 
Mean abnormal accruals for CEOs and CFOs are calculated separately by transaction size. Size of sales and purchases (grants) are measured as the 
proportion of shares sold or purchased to shares (shares+options) owned prior to the transaction, standardized for each executive type by industry. 
Small, medium and large sales are those that fall within the lowest, middle and highest thirds of the sample distribution, respectively, for each executive 
type. Only those transaction-quarters for which no transactions other than the one of interest are reported and for which no stock sales have occurred 
within the prior six quarters are included. 
CEOs CFOs
              Transaction Size Large Mean               Transaction Size Large Mean
N per Minus N per Minus
Group Small Medium Large Control Mean Group Small Medium Large Control Mean
Option Grants 172 0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0017 156 -0.0071* -0.0046 0.0001 -0.0011
(0.44) (-0.36) (-0.03) (0.39) (-1.58) (-1.11) (0.02) (-0.2)
Stock Purchases 58 -0.0014 -0.0092* -0.0101* -0.0117* 46 0.0047 0.0009 0.0128** 0.0116*
(-0.24) (-1.31) (-1.57) (-1.43) (0.63) (0.11) (1.80) (1.60)
Stock Sale 100 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0043** 0.0027* 70 0.0019 -0.0017 0.0015 0.0002
(-0.17) (-0.33) (2.26) (1.53) (0.76) (-0.67) (0.54) (0.17)
Sales  quarter+1 83 0.0007 0.0011 0.0076*** 0.0060*** 57 0.0007 0.0012 0.0006 -0.0007
(0.39) (0.66) (3.91) (2.72) (0.26) (0.47) (0.21) (0.21)
Sales  quarter+2 55 0.0005 0.0011 0.0058*** 0.0042* 39 0.0011 0.0000 0.0021 0.0009
(0.29) (0.67) (2.92) (1.28) (.38) (0.03) (0.79) (1.02)
Sales  quarter+3 56 0.0010 0.0018 0.0074*** 0.0058* 34 0.0022 -0.0015 0.0050** 0.0038**
(0.52) (1.07) (3.59) (1.46) (0.76) (-0.50) (1.79) (1.66)
Sales  quarter+4 43 0.0001 0.0021* 0.0081** 0.0065 21 0.0019 -0.0010 0.0047** 0.0035
(0.05) (1.28) (2.03) (0.29) (0.58) (-0.34) (1.73) (0.38)
Sales  quarter+5 38 -0.0014 0.0045*** 0.0092*** 0.0076* 24 0.0051* -0.0014 0.0065** 0.0053
(-0.65) (2.64) (4.18) (1.29) (1.64) (-0.46) (2.28) (0.83)
Sales  quarter+6 33 -0.0015 0.0019 0.0110*** 0.0094*** 19 0.0078*** -0.0021 0.0078*** 0.0066*
(-0.69) (1.08) (4.88) (2.32) (2.38) (-0.64) (2.74) (1.28)
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Table 10 
Regressions of Abnormal Accruals on Insider Transactions
This table presents the coefficients from regressions of abnormal accruals on insider transactions and 
control variables. Grant, purchase and the sale variables are indicator variables that equal one if the 
transaction is in the upper one-third of the size distribution for the transaction-executive combination. T 
statistics appear in italics below the coefficient estimates. The two regression models appear at the bottom 
of the second page of the table. Variables are defined in Appendix B.
             Equation (9)              Equation (10)
Predicted Sign CEO CFO CEO CFO
Intercept 0.0007 0.0012* 0.0008 0.0010
0.91 1.38 1.09 1.16
Grant − -0.0016 -0.0046** -0.0021 -0.0046**
-0.71 -1.51 -0.90 -1.71
Grant * G + 0.0020 -0.0005
1.07 -0.20
Purchase − -0.0070*** -0.0014 -0.0069*** -0.0012
-2.87 -0.47 -2.82 -0.40
Purchase * G 0.0013 0.0009
0.59 0.61
Sale + -0.0034* -0.0014 -0.0027* -0.0016
-1.51 -0.44 -1.42 -0.51
Sale * G − -0.0014 0.0020
-0.80 0.84
Sale+1 + 0.0038* -0.0028 0.0042** -0.0032
1.52 -0.83 1.65 -0.97
Sale+1 * G − -0.0014 0.0009
-0.79 0.63
Sale+2 + 0.0015 -0.0005 0.0014 -0.0011
0.59 -0.14 0.52 -0.29
Sale+2 * G − 0.0001 0.0024
0.07 1.20
Sale+3 + 0.0017 0.0025 0.0019 0.0021
0.65 0.70 0.72 0.57
Sale+3 * G − -0.0015 0.0011
-0.81 0.61
Sale+4 + 0.0033* 0.0002 0.0032* -0.0003
1.28 0.06 1.36 -0.06
Sale+4 * G − 0.0012 0.0008
0.59 1.09
Sale+5 + 0.0038* 0.0052* 0.0036* 0.0046
1.33 1.29 1.37 1.15
Sale+5 * G − 0.0011 0.0021
0.53 0.73
Sale+6 + 0.0054** 0.0034 0.0055** 0.0027
1.80 0.77 1.82 0.61
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Table 10, continued
             Equation (9)              Equation (10)
Predicted Sign CEO CFO CEO CFO
Sale+6 * G − -0.0015 -0.0001
-0.69 -0.02
Governance score − 0.0068 0.0164
0.90 1.24
Sale * Buy    ? 0.0006 0.0125* -0.0005 -0.0011
0.81 1.33 -0.76 -0.20
Sale+1 * Buy    ? -0.0025 -0.0018 0.0026 -0.0018
-0.74 -0.31 0.75 -0.17
Sale+2 * Buy    ? 0.0012 -0.0004 0.0010 -0.0010
0.78 -0.33 0.31 -0.70
Sale+3 * Buy    ? 0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0001 0.0013
0.28 -0.77 -0.01 0.12
Sale+4 * Buy    ? 0.0001 0.0003 0.0006 -0.0003
0.01 0.02 0.79 -0.44
Sale+5 * Buy    ? 0.0065 -0.0065 0.0020 0.0046
0.80 -0.50 0.24 1.26
Sale+6 * Buy    ? 0.0022 0.00154* -0.0021*** -0.0022***
0.26 1.33 -3.02 -4.36
Size − -0.0009* -0.0001 -0.0008 0.0011**
-1.48 -0.18 -1.05 1.92
Return on assets − -0.0022*** -0.0006 -0.0023*** -0.0007**
-3.62 -0.73 -3.78 -1.67
Market to book ? -0.0033*** -0.0045*** -0.0030*** -0.0041***
-5.67 -5.98 -4.88 -5.37
Debt to assets + -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004
-0.46 -0.54 -0.49 -0.58
Stock volatility ? -0.0008* -0.0022*** -0.0012** -0.0025***
-1.41 -2.91 -1.73 -3.22
Adjust R square 0.0108 0.0114 0.0134 0.0168
*,**,***denote significance at p=0.10, 0.05, 0.01, respectively 














































Black Scholes Option Valuation 
Option values are calculated for each option grant using the Black Scholes (1973) 































Salary = Annual salary as reported by Execucomp
Bonus = Annual bonus (Execucomp) scaled by the sum of salary and bonus
Stock = Shares of unrestricted stock owned by CEO
Restricted stock = Shares of restricted stock held by CEO
Options = Shares of stock underlying options held
Grants = Shares of stock underlying annual option grants
Exercises = Shares of stock underlying options exercised during the year
Total sensitivity = Change in value of stock and option holdings given a 1% change in year-end 
stock price scaled by the sum of salary and bonus
TS*G = Interaction term between total sensitivity and governance score (defined 
below) 
TS2 = Total sensitivity squared
Stock-based wealth 
sensitivity
= Change in value of stock holdings given a 1% change in year-end stock price 
scaled by the sum of salary and bonus
S*G = Interaction term between stock-based wealth sensitivity and governance 
score (defined below)
S2 = Stock-based wealth sensitivity squared
Option-based wealth 
sensitivity
= Change in Black-Scholes value of option holdings given a 1% change in 
year-end stock price scaled by the sum of salary and bonus
O*G = Interaction term between option-based wealth sensitivity and governance 
score (defined below)
O2 = Option-based wealth sensitivity squared
Vested options = Options that are vested as of fiscal year-end plus options that vest during the 
next fiscal year
Vested sensitivity = Change in Black-Scholes value of vested options given a 1% change in year-
end stock price scaled by the sum of salary and bonus
V*G = Interaction term between vested sensitivity and governance score (defined 
below)
V2 = Vested sensitivity squared
Unvested options = Options that are unvested and will remain unvested for  next fiscal year 
Unvested sensitivity = Change in Black-Scholes value of unvested options given a 1% change in 
year-end stock price scaled by the sum of salary and bonus
U*G = Interaction term between unvested sensitivity and governance score (defined 
below)
U2 = Unvested sensitivity squared
Salary = Annual salary as reported by Execucomp
Bonus = Annual bonus (Execucomp) scaled by the sum of salary and bonus
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Appendix B, continued 1
Outside = Fraction of the total board of directors comprised of directors with no (non-
director) affiliation with firm
Directors = Total number of directors on the board
Meetings = Number of meetings held by board of directors during the year
Institutional holdings = Fraction of firm’s shares of common stock held by institutional investors 
with holdings reportable on form 13f
G score = Composite measure of shareholder protection from Gompers et al. (2003)
Governance score = Composite measure of governance strength based on outside, directors, 
meetings, institutional holdings and G score, constructed using principal 
component analysis
Total assets = Total assets at fiscal year-end (Compustat data item 6)
Sales = Total sales for fiscal year (Compustat data item 12)
Market value of equity = Total common shares outstanding at fiscal year-end (Compustat data item 
25) times price per share at fiscal year-end (Compustat data item 24)
Size = Natural logarithm of market value of equity
Market to book (MTB) = Market value of equity divided by book value of equity (Compustat data 
item 60)
Return on assets 
(ROA)
= Net income (Compustat data item 172) divided by total assets (Compustat 
data item 6)
Debt to assets (DTA) = Total liabilities (Compustat data item 181) divided by total assets 
Abnormal accruals 
(EM)
= Abnormal accruals estimated using a cross-sectional modified Jones model 
scaled by beginning of the year total assets
Positive abnormal 
accruals (EM+)
= Abnormal accruals with value greater than or equal to zero
Negative abnormal 
accruals (EM −)
= Abnormal accruals with value less than zero
Earnings surprise = The difference between actual and expected earnings scaled by expected 
earnings where expected earnings are based on a random walk with drift 
Net income = Net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
(Compustat data item 18)
Grant = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a large option grant occurred in the period
Grant*G = Interaction term between grant and governance score
Purchase = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a large stock purchase occurred in the period
Purchase*G = Interaction term between purchase and governance score
Sale = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a large stock purchase occurred in the period
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Appendix B, continued 2
Sale*G = Interaction term between sale and governance score
Sale+1 (Salet-1) = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a large stock sale occurred in the prior period
Sale+1 * G = Interaction term between sale+1 and governance score
Sale+2 (Salet-2) = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a large stock sale occurred two periods prior
Sale+2 * G = Interaction term between sale+2 and governance score
Sale+3 (Salet-3) = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a large stock sale occurred three periods prior
Sale+3 * G = Interaction term between sale+3 and governance score
Sale+4 (Salet-4) = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a large stock sale occurred four periods prior
Sale+4* G = Interaction term between sale+4 and governance score
Sale+5 (Salet-5) = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a large stock sale occurred five periods prior
Sale+5 * G = Interaction term between sale+5 and governance score
Sale+6 (Salet-6) = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a large stock sale occurred six periods prior
Sale+6 * G = Interaction term between sale+6 and governance score
Buy = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a large purchase or large grant occurred in the 
period
Sale*Buy = Interaction term between sale and buy; term is equal to one if both sale and 
buy occurred in the period 
Sale+1*Buy = Interaction term between sale and buy; term is equal to one if a sale occurred 
in the prior period and buy occurred in the current period 
Sale+2*Buy = Interaction term between sale and buy; term is equal to one if a sale occurred 
two periods prior and buy occurred in the current period 
Sale+3*Buy = Interaction term between sale and buy; term is equal to one if a sale occurred 
three periods prior and buy occurred in the current period 
Sale+4*Buy = Interaction term between sale and buy; term is equal to one if a sale occurred 
four periods prior and buy occurred in the current period 
Sale+5*Buy = Interaction term between sale and buy; term is equal to one if a sale occurred 
five periods prior and buy occurred in the current period 
Sale+6*Buy = Interaction term between sale and buy; term is equal to one if a sale occurred 
six periods prior and buy occurred in the current period 
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